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1. Introduction
Focussing attention on one task necessarily goes hand in hand with a decrease in attention
to other tasks (Kahneman (1973)). This well-established psychological constraint forces
market participants to be selective in information processing. In this paper we empirically
explore asset pricing implications of time-varying attention towards firm-level information.
At first, this requires answers to two questions: How does one proxy for the unobservable
dynamics of investor attention? And in which settings do attention shifts matter?
A few studies so far have dealt with these questions. They propose simple, intuitive
proxies for limited attention and then almost exclusively apply them to explain time-series
variation in the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). Hirshleifer
et al. (2009) use the number of same day earnings releases that compete for investors’
attention. Similarly, Peress (2008) counts the total number of firms featured in the Wall
Street Journal. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) rely on a Friday dummy by arguing that
investors are distracted by the upcoming weekend. Hou et al. (2009) use down market
periods, during which investors are assumed to “put their heads in the sand”. All papers
find that the PEAD is stronger if investor attention is low.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a novel proxy, which builds on recent
theoretical work on the dynamics of attention allocation (e.g. Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong
(2006)). These models argue that investors aim at optimally allocating their effort across
several aggregation levels, which they do depending on priority and urgency. News relevant
primarily on some aggregated level typically get most attention, as this information tends
to be most important for the valuation of the investor’s overall portfolio.1 Remaining
capacities are then used to process more disaggregated (e.g. firm-level) news.
This setting has intuitively appealing time-series implications: If the investor needs to
focus on the big picture (the “forest”), he has necessarily fewer resources available to
devote to details (the “trees”). As Peng and Xiong (2006) summarize: “In severely con-
1A direct consequence of this form of attention allocation is category learning behavior, for which there is now ample
evidence. Theoretical work includes e.g. Mullainathan (2002) or Barberis and Shleifer (2003). On the empirical side, vivid
examples of category thinking are for instance given in Cooper et al. (2001) or Cooper et al. (2005). Category learning
also leads to excessive return comovement as recently identified in various settings (e.g. Barberis et al. (2005), Greenwood
(2008), Boyer (2011), Green and Hwang (2009) or Pirinsky and Wang (2006)).
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strained cases, the investor allocates all attention to market- and sector-level information
and ignores all the firm-specific data” (p. 565).
Consequently, the proxy aims at quantifying the unexpected daily information load
market participants need to process in order to timely assess the overall market situation.
Building on the premise that information shocks partly manifest themselves in abnor-
mal returns, we condense the magnitude and dissemination of unanticipated daily return
shocks in a broad range of market segments into a single ratio. We perform yearly decile
sorts of this variable. This results in about 25 “high distraction days” (decile 10) in each
year, during which we expect investors’ full attention to have been directed to the market-
level. There are also about 25 “low distraction days” (decile 1), during which we expect
sufficient cognitive resources to have been devoted to individual firms. Several conceptu-
ally quite diverse tests collectively lend support to the idea that the proxy is indeed able
to identify investor attention shifts.
Second, and in order to show its economic implications, we apply the proxy to sev-
eral puzzling return phenomena. We start with the PEAD (Bernard and Thomas (1989))
which the previous attention literature has focused on. However, we also investigate the
predictability of a broad range of momentum strategies (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). In
addition, we devote special effort to explore the time-varying profitability of pairs trading
(Gatev et al. (2006), Engelberg et al. (2009)). This popular relative-value arbitrage ap-
proach employs statistical methods to identify economically linked firms and then exploits
slow information diffusion between these firms by means of a long-short strategy.
As we outline below, studying these three asset pricing phenomena jointly is a promis-
ing and natural approach to gain novel insights into the role of time-varying attention
allocation in financial markets. To put it briefly, there are good reasons to believe that
each of these long-standing return anomalies might be partly driven by the dynamics of
attention. However, behavioral theories suggest that the implications of the amount of
attention devoted to affected firms differ across anomalies due to conceptual differences.
This rich set of predictions allows us to empirically discriminate the investor attention hy-
pothesis against alternative conjectures about the sources of these anomalies. The essence
of our findings is captured in figure 1.
Please insert figure 1
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The discovered findings indicate that the attention shift proxy has statistically sig-
nificant and economically meaningful predictive power for the magnitude of each return
anomaly. We discuss anomalies one by one and start with the PEAD.
If investors are temporarily distracted, the information contained in earnings surprises
may not immediately be incorporated into prices, giving rise to a predictable return drift
over the next weeks. Our findings support this notion, which has been formalized in the
models of e.g. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) or Hirshleifer et al. (2011). The difference in
cumulative abnormal returns over days t=2 to t=60 between firms with positive earnings
surprises and those with negative surprises is only 1.86% and insignificant, conditional
on the announcement at t=0 having taken place on a low distraction day. However, the
difference amounts to 4.28% if earnings were announced on a high distraction day, giving
rise to a significant difference of differences. As these findings are in line with previous
work, they might also be regarded as an important validation check of the novel proxy.
However, as Hou et al. (2009) highlight, attention effects are likely to play a dual role.
They are also at the heart of overreaction-driven return anomalies, which are typically
considered to be caused by behavioral biases. If attention interacts with or exacerbates
these biases, then situations may occur in which a subset of investors does not pay “too
little” attention to individual stocks, but “too much”. Several papers show that this
phenomenon often results in fundamentally mostly unjustified abnormal returns followed
by reversals (e.g. Barber and Odean (2008), Engelberg et al. (2011), Lou (2011), Seasholes
and Wu (2007), Yuan (2012)).
Among the anomalies of this type, the momentum effect is arguably among the most
persistent (e.g. Fama and French (2008)), widespread (e.g. Asness et al. (2012)), and
prominent (e.g. Chui et al. (2010)). Several behavioral theories attribute momentum and
its subsequent reversal to systematic biases in information processing, such as extrapola-
tive expectations (Long et al. (1990)) or overconfidence in conjunction with self-attribution
(Daniel et al. (1998)). Empirical work provides support for these overreaction theories and
moreover shows that excessive attention thereby plays a key role.2
Thus, in the case of overreaction-driven momentum the impact of attention towards
2A non-exhaustive list includes Antoniou et al. (2010), Byun et al. (2013), Chui et al. (2010), Cooper et al. (2004), Da
et al. (2011), Hou et al. (2009), Hillert et al. (2013), Lee and Swaminathan (2000), and Stambaugh et al. (2012).
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individual firms should work in the opposite direction as compared to its role for
underreaction-driven PEAD. Figure 1 shows that this hypothesis proves true. It displays
average monthly returns generated by a composite momentum strategy (with overlapping
portfolios) constructed from fourteen traditional or enhanced momentum strategies pro-
posed in the literature. The average momentum return over January 1962 to December
2008 is essentially insignificant (0.32%, t-statistic 0.71) following the two months which
are characterized as high distraction periods in each year. However, returns are much
larger (1.82%, t-statistic 5.25) than usual in the two months defined as periods of low
distraction.
Finally, figure 1 shows findings for pairs trading. This anomaly is loosely related to
deviations of the law of one price and thus offers another conceptually different and also
previously neglected setting. From the overall 200 million eligible sets of two stocks in
our baseline US sample, we identify those which have moved together the most histori-
cally. Each month, we select the 100 pairs with minimum distance between normalized
historical return paths, verify that they are large and liquid, and then trade them over
the next six months. Specifically, whenever cumulative daily returns of any of these top
pairs sufficiently diverge, we short the relatively overpriced winner and buy the relatively
underpriced loser. If the future resembles the past, prices are likely to finally converge
again, thereby generating positive returns on zero-cost portfolios of economic substitutes.
Our findings show that the one-month event-time return on pairs opening on high
distraction days is more than twice as high as the return generated on pairs diverging on
low distraction days. This insight is based on more than 100,000 round-trip trades between
January 1962 and December 2008. We analyze the case of pairs trading in particular depth
for a number of reasons.
Linking the type of cross-return predictability observable in pairs trading with time-
varying investor attention is a novel and in our view appealing approach. Related studies
have shown that limited attention can cause autocorrelation in returns (e.g. Hong et al.
(2000)) or lead-lag effects between portfolios of stocks (e.g. Hong et al. (2007), Hou (2007))
and along the supply chain (Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Menzly and Ozbas (2010)). Pairs
trading, however, is about predicting the relative performance of two typically large stocks,
of which neither is the systematic leader. It is a short-term strategy whose profitability
almost monotonically declines in event-time (e.g. Section 4) and which is more pronounced
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for pairs with sluggish cross-stock information transfer (Engelberg et al. (2009), Chen
et al. (2012)). We provide a number of additional findings which support the notion
of slow information diffusion due to limited attention being the cause for short-term
mispricings. For example, pairs particularly neglected (covered) by the media appear
more (less) profitable and exhibit a higher (lower) sensitivity to attention shifts.
Moreover, the setting in pairs trading is related to other pervasive empirical puzzles,
in which there are price discrepancies between similar assets.3 In a broader sense, our in-
depth analysis of pairs trading might thus help to better understand how limited attention
affects the efficiency of fundamentally linked assets in practice.
In addition, and in contrast to the classical anomalies PEAD as well as momentum,
comprehensive empirical studies on the drivers of pairs trading are still rare. This is
surprising given its “disarmingly simple” concept (Gatev et al. (2006), p. 797), its apparent
violation of even the weak form of market efficiency, as well as its popularity among
practitioners.4 Moreover, very little is known about pairs trading in international markets,
even though only few trading strategies have survived the test of time and independent
scrutiny. As a consequence, it is still an open question when, where, and why pairs trading
is particularly profitable. We address this gap in the literature with a data set of about
25 million firm days from eight major non-US stock markets.
While figure 1 provides a first glance at the findings, we present the full results in
the following sections. It should be noted that all asset pricing tests rely on firms with
a market capitalization above the first NYSE decile (NYSE/Amex median in the case of
pairs trading) and a stock price of at least 5 USD. This results in eliminating almost half
of the firm months in the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq universe. Moreover, to further mitigate
3For instance, Lee et al. (1991), Pontiff (1995), Chay and Trzcinka (1999), and Cherkes et al. (2009) focus on the
relationship of the prices of closed-end fund shares and the per share market value of the assets held by the funds. Mitchell
et al. (2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003) study situations in which a firm’s market value is less than the value of its
ownership stake in a publicly traded subsidiary. Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), Scruggs (2007),
Jong et al. (2009), and Baker et al. (2012) study price parity deviations of dual-listed companies (“Siamese Twins”). Gagnon
and Karolyi (2010) study discrepancies between the prices of US and home-market shares of companies with cross-listed
stocks. Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995), Zingales (1995), and Schultz and Shive (2010) study dual class shares issued by the
same company, that differ in voting rights, but have equal cash flow rights.
4Gatev et al. (2006) refer to pairs trading as being “among the proprietary “statistical arbitrage” tools currently used
by hedge funds as well as investment banks” (p. 797). Similarly, in a practitioner’s book, Vidyamurthy (2004) concludes
that pairs trading has “increased in popularity and has become a common trading strategy” (p. 74). Andrade et al. (2005)
estimate the realized profit from pairs trading for sophisticated investors at “hundreds of millions of dollars” (p. 3).
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microstructural effects, all tests based on daily data skip a day before trading is initiated.
Our findings are stable when a comprehensive list of control variables, both in the cross-
section and in the time-series, is taken into consideration. A particular focus is on variables
deemed to be related to market frictions. In addition to standard firm characteristics such
as size, industry membership, or idiosyncratic volatility, we include various proxies for
trading costs such as the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio or the recently proposed daily
bid-ask spread measure of Corwin and Schultz (2012).
Market-level controls include, for instance, the Fama and French (1993) factors and
other well-established risk premiums (such as short-term reversal), squared market re-
turn, volatility, turnover, VIX, TED spread, interest rates, or average bid-ask spreads.
Finally, we control for calendar effects and previously proposed time-series determinants
of the return anomalies. Overall, findings are stable across a number of robustness checks,
including subperiod results and limits to arbitrage.
2. Attention shift proxy
2.1. Empirical design
Inspired by models such as Peng and Xiong (2006), we aim at identifying days on which
market participants are likely to be forced to spend more (or less) resources than usual
on understanding “the big picture”. Operationalizing this idea leaves many degrees of
freedom. We thus start by constructing a baseline proxy designed as simple as possible
and later modify its construction extensively.
A four-step procedure is employed. First, we define the 49 Fama and French (1997)
industries as market segments. As this classification has been shown to represent economic
boundaries (e.g. Chan et al. (2007)) as well as informational boundaries (e.g. Menzly and
Ozbas (2010)), the use of industries in the baseline analysis is an intuitive choice. For
January 1960 to December 2008, we compute daily value-weighted returns for all 49
industries separately, thereby taking into account all common shares traded on NYSE,
Amex or Nasdaq. Second, we rely on a simple OLS market model to decompose returns
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Ri,t of market segment i on day t. This allows us to identify return shocks ARi,t:
ARi,t =| Ri,t − α̂i,t − β̂i,tRm,t | (1)
Parameter estimates are obtained from rolling time-series regressions based on daily return
data over the previous year. Third, we condense these shocks into a single measure. From
the several plausible weighting schemes we choose an approach that takes the expected
level and frequency of market segment-specific shocks into account. Each segment weight
wi,t is determined by the inverse of the volatility σi,t of the shock variable ARi,t as follows:
49∑
i=1








Shock volatilities σi,t are estimated from ARi,t over the previous year. The weighting ap-
proach applies to the intuition that a pronounced return shock in a segment for which large
shocks are a common occurrence is less likely to unexpectedly demand extra attention
than a pronounced shock in a market segment which “usually behaves as expected”. The
appendix displays the time-series of the values obtained after this third step. There are
several phases (but no general time trend), in which values typically differ substantially
from the sample average.
To thoroughly test for attention effects, we follow the methodology of Hirshleifer et al.
(2009) by performing yearly sorts of the values from equation (2) as the fourth and final
step. For each year individually, we assign a decile rank to each trading day. This approach
might be considered conservative in that we identify the same number of high and low
distraction days in each year, irrespective of the actual market environment. Pooling the
data results in roughly 1,180 days per decile rank.
Figure 2 shows the time-series of the monthly number of high and low distraction
days, thereby demonstrating that these days are typically not heavily clustered in certain
months within a given year.
Please insert figure 2
Closer inspection reveals that this holds also true if one takes all deciles into account.
The 25th (75th) percentile of the monthly average of daily decile ranks is 4.33 (6.51). The
5th (95th) percentile is 3 (8.18). Thus, findings in later tests will not be driven by a few
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extreme months. As the appendix verifies, findings are also not driven by a few extreme
market segments.
2.2. Do we capture attention shifts?
In the following, we present main insights from five validation checks of the attention shift
proxy. Details about the design and further tests are reported in the appendix.
Yuan (2012) provides evidence that record levels for the Dow Jones Industrial Average
as well as front-page articles about the stock market are market-wide attention-grabbing
events. A meaningful attention shift proxy should thus indicate that the amount of atten-
tion market participants direct to aggregate information during these days should increase
relative to the amount of attention devoted to firm-level news.
Our findings provide support for this line of reasoning. The unconditional probability of
observing a stock market article on the front-page of the New York Times over our sample
period from January 1980 to December 2008 is 4.52%. In contrast, on the day after a low
(high) distraction day, the likelihood is 1.99% (12.16%). Similarly, a new record level of
the Dow is observed on 5.59% of all trading days between January 1962 and December
2007. However, the corresponding value for low (high) distraction days is 4.03% (6.15%).
The investor distraction proxy of Hirshleifer et al. (2009) aims at quantifying the num-
ber of competing information signals that draw attention away from a given firm. The
average decile rank of the Hirshleifer et al. (2009) proxy over July 1971 to December 2008
is 4.76 on low distraction days, but 5.93 on high distraction days. In other words, both
proxies tend to partly identify similar situations.
Recent work such as Da et al. (2011) or Mondria and Wu (2012) demonstrate that
analyzing shocks in search terms entered into Google is a promising way of quantifying
short-term investor attention allocation and information processing. We follow previous
literature in measuring the interest in individual firms by the search volume of ticker
symbols. Interest in aggregated information is quantified with search terms like “stock
market”, “market segments” or “stocks”. Indeed, high (low) distraction days are ceteris
paribus associated with a relatively increasing demand for aggregate information in re-
lation to the demand for firm-level information. As a rough estimate, a one standard
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deviation change of the Google-based proxy is associated with a 0.7 point change in at-
tention shift proxy decile ranks.
Shifting attention towards aggregate information tends to go along with category learn-
ing behavior (see footnote 1). This suggests that true firm-specific turnover, i.e. firm-level
trading activity orthogonal to market as well as market-sector trading activity, should
be lower on high distraction days. Our findings support this conjecture. For each year
from 1962 to 2008 separately, we create a decile-based measure of average daily residual
firm-level turnover. The average decile rank is 6.23 on low distraction days, but only 4.43
on high distraction days. This is particularly noteworthy as market turnover is positively
related to the attention shift proxy, as the following section shows.
2.3. Time-series characteristics of the baseline proxy
Figure 2 displays correlation coefficients between attention shift proxy decile ranks and
the rank order of market-level variables, expressed both in raw values and yearly decile
ranks. The proxy is essentially uncorrelated with standard risk premiums (including the
market excess return or the short-term reversal factor) and weakly positively (0.1-0.25)
correlated with factors each assumed to capture a specific aspect of unexpected market
conditions. The latter include squared market return, market turnover, rolling ten day
return volatility from t-10 to t-1, as well as the average daily bid-ask spread of firms
larger than the first NYSE decile, computed as suggested by Corwin and Schultz (2012).
We additionally derive a number of promising proxies for arbitrage risk in the time-
series from previous work: VIX, TED spread, Moody’s BAA to AAA yield spread, term
spread, interest rate, and a measure building on abnormal stock returns of investment
banks.5 The appendix gives more details about the construction of all six proxies, for
which data availability on a daily basis starts between 1980 and 1990. Figure 2 verifies
5Brunnermeier et al. (2008) rely on the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX) as well as on
the TED spread in an attempt to proxy for “speculators’ willingness and ability to put capital at risk” (p. 334, see also e.g.
Asness et al. (2012), Ben-David et al. (2012), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Frazzini and Pedersen (2013), Moskowitz
et al. (2012)). The VIX a popular measure of the volatility implied in S&P 500 index options and widely considered to be
a forward-looking measure of overall market uncertainty. A high TED spread, i.e. the difference between the three-month
LIBOR interbank market interest rate and the risk-free three-month T-Bill rate, signals that capital is becoming scarce
and borrowing is becoming difficult. For a motivation of the other proxies see e.g. Engelberg et al. (2009), Pontiff (1996),
Buraschi et al. (2012), Ang et al. (2011) or Menzly and Ozbas (2010).
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that correlation coefficients are again low with a typical range from 0 to 0.25.
In conclusion, it can be said that the attention shift proxy appears to be at best weakly
related to market frictions. We later control for all variables outlined above.
2.4. Modifications of the baseline proxy
To assure robustness, we construct twelve alternative proxies, which modify the original
approach in many dimensions. They differ, for instance, with respect to the type and
number of market segments used (49 industries, 100 portfolios sorted on book-to-market
ratio and firm size, 25 portfolios sorted on size and short-term reversal) and the weighting
scheme of return shocks (volatility weighting, equal weighting, value weighting, interquar-
tile range). They also differ with respect to the model of expected return (market model,
four factor model), the type of returns used (raw returns, abnormal returns, abnormal
returns orthogonal to idiosyncratic firm-level volatility), and the timing of the returns
used (yearly sorts, rolling historical values to assure real-time implementability).
The appendix provides detailed information about these proxies. We have made sure
that the qualitative nature of our findings for all anomalies remains stable regardless of
which specific proxy design we rely on.
3. Application to classical stock market anomalies
3.1. Underreaction phenomenon: Post-earnings-announcement drift
We closely follow the methodology of previous work, such as Hirshleifer et al. (2009) or
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). As the recording of many announcements has been shown
to be error-prone before 1995, we start by gathering quarterly earnings announcement
data from January 1995 to December 2008. Earnings surprises are defined as the differ-
ence between the actual announced earnings as reported in the I/B/E/S detail tape and
the median estimate from individual analysts. To assure comparability across firms and
quarters, differences are normalized by the stock price. In an attempt to exclude stale
forecasts, we only consider one- or two-quarter-ahead estimates issued or reviewed no
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more than 60 calendar days before the actual announcement. If a given analyst made
several forecasts for the same announcement, we only consider his most recent estimate.
The data is then matched with daily stock prices from CRSP. We impose several screens
intended to filter out small and illiquid firms and to minimize the impact of possible
data errors or outliers.6 In total, 101,812 events remain. Next, we perform independent
quarterly decile sorts of earnings surprises. Thus, a value of 10 (1) denotes very positive
(negative) surprises in a given quarter.
As the major part of the PEAD is attributable to roughly the first 60 trading days
(e.g. Bernard and Thomas (1989)), we focus on the period from t=2 to t=60. The lag
after the actual event in t=0 aims at minimizing the impact of microstructural effects.
Cumulative stock-level abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the raw
buy-and-hold return over the event window and the expected beta-adjusted buy-and-hold
return over the same period.
Finally, we rely on the following regression framework (e.g. Hirshleifer et al. (2009)).
CAR refers to the cumulative abnormal return, and FS (ASP ) denotes the decile rank of
forecast surprises (attention shifts). Yi refers to a vector of control variables, which are all
interacted with FS. The interaction effect FSxASP is the variable of primary interest.
A positive coefficient implies a higher sensitivity of post-announcement abnormal returns
to earnings surprises on high distraction days, holding all other factors fixed.






γi(FS x Yi)+ ε (3)
Firm-level controls include size, market-to-book ratio, the Campbell et al. (2008) distress
measure, the daily bid-ask spread measure of Corwin and Schultz (2012), the number
of analysts covering the firm, idiosyncratic volatility, parameters from the estimation of
expected returns (beta, alpha, R2), turnover, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, share
price, dummies for Nasdaq and S&P 500 membership, dummies for the 49 Fama and
French (1997) industries, dummies for lottery and non-lottery stocks as in Kumar (2009),
6We only consider firms with a market capitalization larger than the first NYSE decile and a stock price larger than 5
USD at the beginning of the previous month. As in previous literature, we exclude observations from the sample if at least
one of the following conditions is met: The announcement takes place on a non-trading day. An earnings surprise cannot
be computed, for instance as I/B/E/S information cannot be linked with CRSP data. The actual or forecasted earnings
are greater than the stock price. For each observation, at least one firm-level control variable (for details see below) cannot
be computed. Finally, in order to be closer to the normality assumption, we winsorize observations above the 99% level or
below the 1% level of the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns over t=2 to t=60.
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and the reporting lag. Details regarding the construction are reported in the appendix.
Findings are robust if we only use a subset of these variables.
Panel A of table 1 displays the main findings. The PEAD is indeed about 50% stronger
for firms announcing their earnings on high as opposed to low distraction days. For in-
stance, the sensitivity in specification 4 is 0.675+10*0.0372=1.047 for attention shift proxy
decile rank 10, but only 0.675+1*0.0372=0.7122 for rank 1. It is thus 47% higher on high
distraction days.
This result is comparable in terms of magnitude to earlier studies with alternative
proxies (e.g. Hirshleifer et al. (2009) or DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)). It holds regardless
of whether we consider all earnings surprises (first two columns) or only the extreme
deciles (last two columns).
Please insert table 1
Robustness checks Panel B verifies that inferences do not change if we take one or
several sets of time-series control variables into account. Calendar effects are controlled for
by the inclusion of dummies for the year of the announcement, the month of the year, as
well as the day of the week. We consider previously proposed attention proxies by including
a dummy for a positive three-year market return (Hou et al. (2009)), a Friday dummy (e.g
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)), and the decile rank of the number of competing earnings
announcements as in Hirshleifer et al. (2009). Market-level controls include all variables
outlined in figure 2 (e.g. 10-day rolling volatility, average daily bid-ask spread, VIX, TED
spread).
The interaction effect remains highly significant in all cases. Untabulated tests show
that it also remains positive once we focus on a subsample of firms which happen to exhibit
similar earnings surprises at least once on both a high and a low distraction day. This
analysis follows Peress (2008) and is intended to control for unobservable heterogeneity
across firms. Finally, further analysis shows that the overall effect is primarily driven by
positive earnings surprises. Time-varying short-selling constraints not fully captured by
the control variables are thus unlikely to drive the documented findings.
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3.2. Overreaction phenomenon: Momentum
Since the seminal study of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), a number of studies has argued
that momentum can be enhanced once one considers the interaction of past returns with
certain firm characteristics. These variables are often argued to amplify behavioral biases
or to proxy for information uncertainty. In an attempt to condense this literature, we con-
struct a composite momentum strategy over the time period of January 1962 to December
2008, which averages the profitability of fourteen individual momentum approaches sug-
gested by previous work.7
Most individual momentum strategies are computed using a formation period of six
months, a skipped month, and a holding period of six months with overlapping portfolios.
Stocks eligible for entering any momentum strategy are required to have a nominal share
price of at least 5 USD and a market capitalization larger than the first NYSE decile at
the time of portfolio formation. Returns for each momentum approach are value-weighted.
Details on the construction are provided in the appendix.
The literature standard is to rely on a monthly frequency for both momentum returns
and explanatory variables. While we have made sure that insights also hold when using
data on a daily frequency, reported findings are based on a monthly attention shift measure
to assure comparability with previous work. First, average monthly values of the baseline
(daily) attention shift proxy as described in detail in Section 2.1. are computed. Second,
for each year individually, these monthly values are sorted in ascending order and assigned
values from 1 to 6. Thus, two months in each year are assigned the same attention shift
rank, although findings are not sensitive to this choice. However, this approach assures a
sufficiently high number of observations. It might moreover be considered conservative as
we do not focus on extreme values and also run the procedure for each year separately.
7In additional to traditional momentum (1), we consider strategies enhanced with the following firm characteristics: (2)
Age (e.g. Zhang (2006)), (3) turnover (e.g. Lee and Swaminathan (2000)), (4) market-to-book ratio (Asness (1997), Daniel
and Titman (1999), Sagi and Seasholes (2007)), (5) credit rating (Avramov et al. (2007)), (6) market capitalization (e.g.
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Hong et al. (2000), Zhang (2006)), (7) residual analyst coverage (e.g. Hong et al. (2000)),
(8) analyst forecast dispersion (Zhang (2006), Verardo (2009)), (9) R2 (Hou et al. (2006)), (10) formation period return
consistency (Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)), (11) (idiosyncratic) volatility (Zhang (2006), Jiang et al. (2005)), and (12)
nearness to 52-week high (George and Hwang (2004)). In addition, we compute two other modifications of the traditional
approach. We consider (13) the extremity of formation period returns (e.g. Bandarchuk and Hilscher (2013)) and (14) the
role of intermediate horizon past performance (Novy-Marx (2012)).
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We then regress the time series of momentum returns on one-month lagged attention
shift proxy ranks. As momentum portfolios are overlapping, we do not intend to pre-
dict momentum in the first month of the holding period. Instead, the coefficients of the
explanatory variables might be regarded as giving an indication for calender-time momen-
tum profitability averaged over the whole evaluation period (of six months). Model 1 is
univariate. Model 2 includes the Fama and French (1993) factors. Model 3 to 6 augment
model 2 with further control variables. Model 3 additionally includes factors for short
term reversal, long term reversal, and liquidity (Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)). It fur-
ther contains monthly versions of those market-level variables covered in detail in figure
2 which are available over the whole sample period. These include, among others, the
squared market return, the average daily bid-ask spread, or market volatility computed
from daily returns in the month under consideration.
Model 4 to 5 additionally contain all proxies for limits to arbitrage illustrated in sec-
tion 2.3., some of which have been explored in previous work on momentum (e.g. Asness
et al. (2012), Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)). Model 6 additionally contains further
variables the literature has linked to time variation in momentum profits. These include
market state (Cooper et al. (2004), Hou et al. (2009)), return dispersion (Stivers and
Sun (2010)), market volatility (e.g. Wang and Xu (2010)), the Baker and Wurgler (2006)
sentiment index (Antoniou et al. (2010), Stambaugh et al. (2012)), and the recently pro-
posed co-momentum measure of Lou and Polk (2012). The appendix provides details on
the construction.
Please insert table 2
A pervasive picture emerges. In all models and sample periods, the impact of the lagged
attention shift proxy on future momentum profits is negative and highly significant. The
effect is also large in economic terms. Depending on the specification, most estimates
suggest that the momentum effect in month t is about 100 to 200 basis points lower if
investor attention in month t-1 was focussed on the market- or sector-level (attention
shift proxy rank 6) rather than on individual firms (attention shift proxy rank 1). About
40% of the effect is attributable to the long leg of the portfolio. In essence, the findings
uncover that momentum strategies have been largely unprofitable following months during
which investors are assumed to have been distracted from processing (and potentially
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overreacting to) firm-level information.8
Indeed, and as seen from figure 1, the average monthly momentum return from 1962
to 2008 is only 0.32% (Gallant (1987)-adjusted t-statistic 0.71) conditional on the two
(lagged) months in each year which are assigned an attention shift proxy rank 6. In
contrast, the momentum effect is 1.82% (t-statistic 5.25) following attention shift proxy
rank 1, which is assumed to capture months during which investors extensively focus on
individual firms. In contrast, the unconditional monthly composite momentum strategy
return is 1.08%.
Robustness checks Untabulated tests verify that the impact of lagged attention
on future momentum is reasonably stable. For instance, the effect remains qualitatively
unchanged if we rely on equal-weighted instead of value-weighted momentum returns.
Moreover, we have analyzed each of the fourteen individual momentum strategies in each
of the six model specifications separately. This operation yields in more than 85% of all
cases findings which are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
4. Application to pairs trading
For the reasons outlined in the introduction, the analysis of limited attention in the context
of pairs trading appears particularly promising and is thus investigated in particular depth.
Our analysis thereby adds to the surprisingly small empirical literature on pairs trading so
far. Gatev et al. (2006) report economically significant and seemingly anomalous profits
between 1962 and 2002. Engelberg et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2012) further explore
cross-sectional patterns. They find that part of the profits seem to stem from differential
immediate responses to news that affect both stocks in the pair. Thus, focussing on the
dynamics of attention allocation seems an intuitive way to gain deeper insights.9
8An untabulated analysis of firm-level residual turnover, computed as in Section 2.2., provides additional support for
this assumption. Firm-specific turnover for stocks which a typical momentum strategy would bet on is higher (lower) than
usual during periods of low (high) distraction.
9Do and Faff (2010), Do and Faff (2012), and Chen et al. (2012) report a declining trend in standard pairs trading
profitability over the recent past, which is partly driven by a higher fraction of nonconvergent pairs. Again, identifying
scenarios in which pairs are ex ante more likely to converge appears crucial to understand the price formation process.
In the international context, Andrade et al. (2005) document annual excess returns of about 10% for the Taiwanese stock
market between 1994 and 2002. They show that uninformed trading shocks are a major driver of the strategy’s profitability.
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4.1. Empirical approach
We obtain daily stock price data on all common shares traded on NYSE or Amex at any
time between January 1960 and December 2008. We impose several restrictions to assure
that only large and liquid stocks enter the analysis.10 To mitigate data mining concerns and
to facilitate comparison with previous work, we widely follow the methodology developed
in Gatev et al. (2006).
Specifically, we use daily price data to compute a stock-specific cumulative total return
index over the whole estimation period. A simple algorithm is then used to determine to
what extent two stocks have moved together historically. Let Ri,t (Rj,t) be the normalized
return series of stock i (j) in estimation period t, which is comprised of trading days 1
to n. The algorithm, intended to provide a parsimonious, intuitive framework to identify







We compute this distance measure for all possible pair combinations, whose number grows
quadratically with the number of eligible stocks. Then we choose at the beginning of each
month the top 100 pairs with minimum distance.
In the baseline analysis, we thereby require firms to belong to one of the 49 Fama
and French (1997) industries, although we later also study pairs from the same industry.
Firms from different industries are interesting candidates for our scenario as industrial
boundaries have been shown to go along with informational boundaries induced by spe-
cialization of e.g. analysts or fund managers (e.g. Hong et al. (2007), Menzly and Ozbas
(2010)). The appendix reveals that the monthly top pairs nevertheless have significantly
correlated earnings surprises in the following quarters. Thus, the economic link between
two firms in our baseline empirical setting might be thought of as being potentially strong,
but simultaneously often also less explicit and transparent. The quantitative mechanism
thus offers an intuitive, parsimonious way of identifying pairs, for which cross-stock infor-
mation transfer is particularly likely to be inhibited in moments of high distraction.
The top pairs are then eligible for trading in the immediately following six month
10We discard all stocks with at least one missing return or zero trading volume on any day of the twelve-month period
during which pairs are matched. Moreover, we only consider stocks with a market capitalization larger than the median of
the NYSE/AMEX stock universe at that time.
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evaluation period. Prices are again set to equal unity. Following Gatev et al. (2006), if
the spread between the cumulative return series of two substitutes exceeds two historical
standard deviations, we take a long position in the relatively underpriced stock and a
short position in the relatively overpriced stock. The self-financing pair is then held for
up to one month. If prices convergence before this cut-off date, the trade is closed with a
gain. If prices do not convergence within a month, positions are offset. This results in a
loss if prices have diverged even further.
A pair may trade several times during the evaluation period. The money invested
in later trades differs depending on whether we report event-time results (the baseline
analysis) or calendar-time results. In event-time, we just again go one dollar long (short)
into the cheap (expensive) stock. In calendar-time, proceeds from previous trades are
reinvested. Nevertheless, overall differences between both methods are small.
Figure 3 illustrates the trading process with examples. Pairs therein open several times
during the evaluation period, however not always in the same direction. This is a com-
monly observed behavior. From the large fraction of pairs that open in total at least three
times, roughly 85% hold each stock at least once in both a long and a short position.
Therefore, the phenomenon is different from the lead-lag relationship studied in earlier
work (e.g. Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Hou (2007), Hong et al. (2007)).
Please insert figure 3
We rely on a conservative return computation scheme. As discussed in Gatev et al.
(2006), we skip one day after the divergence and, provided that the pair converges within a
month, add one day following the crossing of the prices. This method is intended to account
for microstructural effects. Moreover, it works strongly against finding effects attributable
to investor attention, as any information overlooked at the day of divergence might be
incorporated into prices during the next day without entering our return estimates.
4.2. Baseline results: US evidence
We have to ensure that our findings capture the impact of variations in investor inatten-
tion rather than variations in other important variables, particularly related to market
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frictions. Therefore, table 3 compares selected firm-level and pair-level variables. Among
others, these include market capitalization (NYSE/AMEX decile rank), the pre-event
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, average pre-event turnover, turnover on the day of diver-
gence, bid-ask spread at the day of divergence computed as in Corwin and Schultz (2012),
and idiosyncratic risk (e.g. Pontiff (2006)).
Please insert table 3
The table shows four main findings. First, firms in general tend to be large and liquid.
For instance, the median firm belongs to the ninth NYSE/AMEX decile, has an average
daily turnover of 0.11%, and is covered by nine analysts (after 1980, untabulated). About
54% of firms are members of the S&P 500. In close to a third of all pair observations,
both firms belong to the S&P 500.
Second, there are often only small differences in firm characteristics within pairs and
across distraction deciles. There are mixed findings regarding the degree of liquidity on the
day of divergence. While mean turnover is higher on high distraction days, mean bid-ask
spreads are also about 13 basis points higher. These differences vanish once one considers
median values.
Third, both firms and pairs are, in the overall picture, well diversified across industries.
However, utility stocks make up close to 30% of all sample firms and are part of all top
industry group combinations. We address this issue in later tests.
Fourth, the day of divergence is an interesting date. Pairs on average are opened when
cumulative standardized returns have diverged by 6.68%. More than 40% of this difference
is attributable to the day of divergence itself. Thus, understanding the underlying drivers
of stock price behavior on these days is essential. If prices diverge due to idiosyncratic
firm shocks affecting only one constituent, a pairs trading investor is likely to lose money.
If the divergence is due to slow information diffusion between both constituents, he is
likely to earn money.
In multivariate regressions, we later control for all variables outlined above. However,
we start by performing univariate tests. To this end, we compare the average one-month
event-time return on zero-cost pairs sorted by attention shift decile ranks as observed on
the day of pair divergence. Panel A of table 4 shows findings based on more than 100,000
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round trip trades from January 1962 to December 2008. If pairs converge before the month
has passed, we assume that the proceeds are held in cash with zero interest.
Please insert table 4
In line with previous literature, traditional pairs trading appears highly profitable with
an unconditional monthly return of close to 100 basis points per month. However, pairs
opening on low distraction days only yield a return of 53 basis points. In contrast, the
estimate for high distraction days is 130 basis points. The difference between decile 10 and
decile 1 thus amounts to highly significant and economically meaningful 77 basis points
per month.
The effect is not confined to the extreme distraction deciles: Decile 2 to 9 show an al-
most monotonic increase in profitability. The appendix provides more detailed information
about the return distribution. It also verifies that several popular performance measures
such as the Sharpe Ratio paint a very similar picture: Trades on high distraction days
strongly outperform trades on low distraction days.
To gain more insight into this matter, we study the mechanisms behind these return
differences. The limited attention hypothesis predicts that the probability of convergence
in the days following divergence should be higher. Imagine, for instance that common
news during times of high distraction is released, which clearly and directly affects the
first firm in the pair, but has an only indirect and less clear impact on the second firm.
If the news does not become instantaneously and fully incorporated into the price of
the second stock, then price will temporary diverge and lead to the opening of the pair.
Consistent with this line of reasoning, considerably more pairs open on high distraction
than low distraction days (see table 4). When investors become fully aware of the link
between both firms, relative prices should adjust gradually and the pair is likely to finally
converge again.
The second row of panel A in table 4 shows that this prediction is supported by the data.
The average fraction of pairs converging within the month after divergence is 36.3%. For
pairs opening on low distraction days, however, the convergence rate is only 33.4%. This
value almost monotonically increases by distraction deciles, culminating in a convergence
rate of 39.7% for decile 10. In other words, simply switching from low distraction to high
19
distraction days increases the likelihood of convergence by almost 20%.
Figure 4 shows the probability of convergence on a given day in event time. Consistent
with the idea of short-lived investor attention constraints being an important driver of
pairs trading success, the likelihood of convergence within the first event days is consid-
erably higher (lower) for pairs diverging on high (low) distraction days. After about five
days, convergence rates begin to approximate each other more closely until they finally
appear indistinguishable.
Please insert figure 4
The higher convergence rate is particularly noteworthy as initial return differences on
high distraction days are higher (see also figure 4). However, it important to mention
that it is the attention shift proxy, and not the return difference per se that matters. The
latter turns out to be completely insignificant in multivariate regressions. Similar insights
can be gained from double-sorts. For instance, we can restrict the analysis to pairs with
a return difference of e.g. 2% or less on the day of divergence. Under this constraint,
about the same number of pairs opens on high distraction days and low distraction days,
while the return difference is very similar in both cases. However, high distraction pairs
still outperform low distraction pairs by 73 basis points per month. Thus, the predictive
explanatory power of the attention shift proxy is virtually unchanged.
An alternative potential source of profit is that the average return conditioned on
non-convergence could be less negative for pairs opening on high distraction days. The
limited attention hypothesis does not imply that this should be the case: Non-convergence
is (comparatively more) suggestive of idiosyncratic news affecting only one stock in the
pair (e.g. Engelberg et al. (2009)). As this type of information is arguably often easier
to grasp and process than common news affecting the potentially complex relationship
between both firms in the pair, attention constraints should be less binding. Again, table 4
displays findings consistent with this line of reasoning. The difference in returns upon non-
convergence between decile 10 and decile 1 is virtually zero and statistically insignificant.
To control for other factors that might partially drive our findings so far, we conduct
several multivariate tests. The main results are presented in panel B of table 4. The
dependent variable is the pooled one-month event-time return on long-short pairs. The
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independent variable of interest is the attention shift proxy, either quantified by the decile
rank or by a high/low distraction dummy, which is zero for low distraction days (decile
1) and one for high distraction days (decile 10).
The remaining independent variables comprise up to three control sets. The first set
controls for calendar and industry effects (indicator variables for year, month, day of
week, as well as pair industry group combinations). The second set controls for nine
market-level conditions on the day of divergence (market return, squared market return,
market turnover, volatility, factors for daily return premia on size, value, momentum and
short-term reversal, average bid-ask spread). The third set includes in total fifteen firm
and pair characteristics as outlined in table 3. For instance, controls include the return
difference and the average bid-ask spread on the day of pair divergence, the average market
capitalization decile and the idiosyncratic risk of the pair, as well as within-pair differences
of the before mentioned variables. The appendix displays all regression coefficients.
However, the main coefficient of interest is that of the high/low distraction dummy.
Table 4 verifies that the return difference is still estimated to be 50 to 73 basis points per
month. The coefficient on the attention shift proxy decile rank suggests that this finding
is not solely driven by the extreme deciles. In all specifications, attention proxies remain
strongly significant at the one percent level.
4.3. Baseline results: International evidence
An effective way to test the validity of the findings is to evaluate the success of the
approach in independent samples. This is particular appealing as very little is known
about the nature of pairs trading profits in other major international stock markets.
Therefore, we study the dynamics of pairs trading profits in Japan, UK, France, Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands, and Hongkong.11
We gather data from the Compustat Global Daily Stock File. Depending on the avail-
11These markets represent the eight largest non North-American stock markets based on domestic stock market capital-
ization at the end of 2002, as reported by Datastream. This date roughly represents the middle of the sample period for
most of these countries. The number of eight markets is chosen somewhat arbitrarily and can be seen as a compromise
between maximizing the sample size and minimizing the fraction of error-prone daily return and volume data as well as the
number of months with too few eligible stocks for a reasonable analysis.
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ability of reliable trading volume data, the sample period starts at some point in the
middle of the 90s and ends, for all markets, in December 2009. The appendix gives more
detailed information about the samples. In total, the analysis is based on an initial data
set of about 14,000 stocks accounting for 25 million firm days. The analysis closely mir-
rors the US approach in panel A of table 4. Main findings from in total about 200,000
round-trip trades are displayed in table 5.
Please insert table 5
In the recent past, even traditional pairs trading seems to have been profitable in all
countries. Annualized return estimates range from 6% (Italy) to more than 13% (Germany,
France). While these results are interesting in their own way, we again focus on the role
of investor attention, for which we find strong evidence. With the exception of Japan, the
return on pairs opening on low (high) distraction days is smaller (larger) than average
sample returns in every single country. The return difference between decile 10 and decile
1 is, with the exception of Italy and Japan, persistently and strongly significant and
economically meaningful.
Delving further into this analyis, panel B of table 5 reveals that the major driver of
the results is again a higher likelihood of convergence. From low distraction days to high
distraction days, the fraction of converging pairs increases by between 12% (from 43.8%
to 49.1% in Japan) and 87% (from 15.9% to 29.8% in Hongkong). Remarkably, while
pairs trading generates seemingly abnormal returns in all countries, its nature appears to
differ substantially e.g. with regard to the number of pairs traded or the (unconditional)
fraction of converging pairs. Exploring the sources and consequences of these differences
might be an interesting field for further research. In any case, the results strongly confirm
the baseline results obtained for the US market.
4.4. Robustness checks and further insights
The main insights from a number of sensitivity checks are reported in table 6.
Please insert table 6
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Subperiod analysis In panel A, we repeat the baseline analysis for three consecutive
subperiods of approximative equal length. In line with results from previous work (Gatev
et al. (2006), Do and Faff (2010)), returns to traditional pairs trading seem to decline over
time. More importantly though, in all cases, returns originating from divergence on high
distraction days are significantly higher than those obtained on low distraction days.
Variations in the data set We control for the impact of the utility sector in two
ways. First, we rerun the baseline analysis, excluding utility stocks. Second, we identify
the monthly top 100 pairs under the constraint that each firm is only considered once at
maximum. This approach not only decreases the fraction of utility stocks from 30% to
roughly 17%, but also changes the composition of the data set considerably. Panel B of
table 6 verifies that inferences do not change.
Matching procedureWe analyze a subsample of trades specifically designed to isolate
the impact of variations in attention shifts. We restrict our focus to those pairs which
happen to diverge both at least once on a low and on a high distraction day, with the
time difference between the average dates of both type of events being less than a year.
This leaves 5,488 trades in the data set. This procedure controls for all firm and pair-level
variables, including unobserved ones, that do not vary within this time period. Findings
displayed in panel C verify that inferences from the baseline analysis still hold.
Limits to arbitrage It is worth noting that many variables controlled for in the
multivariate regressions in Section 4.2. already proxy for market frictions. This applies to
both cross-sectional controls such as idiosyncratic risk and to time-series controls such as
market volatility or average bid-ask spreads.
In addition, the appendix explores the relation between pairs trading profitability,
attention shifts, and all measures of time-varying arbitrage constraints outlined in Section
2.3., which are not available over the whole sample period. The difference between high
and low distraction days remains highly statistically and economically significant.
These findings also suggest that short-selling constraints do not drive our findings. This
is supported by Gatev et al. (2006) who conclude that for institutional investors “pairs
trading profits are likely to remain essentially unaffected by potential shorting costs” (p.
825). Also Engelberg et al. (2009) summarize that, due to the fact that the typical firm
in pairs trading is large and liquid, “short-sale constraints are not a major friction” (p.
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28). In addition, about 60% of the impact of the attention shift proxy are attributable
to the long leg of the pairs trading portfolio. Finally, untabulated findings show that the
time-series of short interest in the stocks which are part of a pair trade in a given month
is essentially uncorrelated with the monthly attention shift proxy.
Yet another approach to control for frictions is to focus on subsamples for which limits
to arbitrage are arguably less binding. Panel D exemplarily does so by restricting the
analysis to pairs opening on days with positive market returns and to pairs with below
median idiosyncratic risk, respectively. Inferences remain unaffected.
Return factor exposure In an attempt to transfer the event-time results of the
baseline analysis to calendar time, we extend the maximum holding period from one month
to six months. Doing so works strongly against finding differences across attention shift
deciles, but assures two smooth time-series of returns on pairs opening on high and low
distraction days, respectively.In the first model, we regress the resulting time-series return
difference on the Fama and French (1993) factors. The second model additionally includes
the traded liquidity factor constructed in Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) as well as factors
for short-term reversal, medium-term momentum, and long-term reversal. Untabulated
results show that there is no notably loading on any risk premium. However, panel E of
table 6 verifies that alphas are persistently statistically significant.
Alternative econometric approach We run Fama/MacBeth-type regressions by
first estimating yearly pooled cross-sectional regressions of one-month pairs returns on
attention shift decile ranks and then using the time-series of the resulting coefficient to
assess its statistical significance. As panel F shows, the coefficient is positive in about 75%
of all years, highly statistically significant, and economically meaningful.
Modified proxies The appendix shows that inferences do not change if we rely on
any of the twelve modified attention shift proxies briefly described in Section 2.4.. These
insights are important in as they represent a generalization of the findings so far.
For instance, results cannot be explained with time-varying behavior of firm-level id-
iosyncratic volatility (e.g. Brandt et al. (2010), Fink et al. (2010)). Using an orthogonal-
ized proxy returns still yields significant results. Findings are also not attributable to the
joint use of industry classifications for both pair construction and market segments. Using
portfolios (double-)sorted on size as well as book-to-market or short-term reversal leads
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to very similar findings. Note that we later additionally verify that the effect is also signif-
icant for pairs constructed solely from firms of the same industry. Thus, findings are not
driven by e.g. investors reacting properly to news about one industry but over-reacting
to news about another industry during times of distraction.
Further time-series insights into the role of limited attention The appendix
explores the role of previously proposed attention proxies on the profitability of pairs
trading. Findings show that the overall impact of Fridays, down market periods, the
number of competing events, shocks in internet search queries, and holidays reflects our
predictions.
Cross-sectional insights into the role of limited attention We expect the re-
turn sensitivity to changes in investor attention to be positively related to the degree
of informational frictions between the constituents of the pair. We expect these frictions
to be lower for pairs consisting of stocks from the same industry or even consisting of
value-weighted industry portfolios. Panel A of table 7 shows findings supporting our line
of reasoning. Compared to the baseline pairs universe, the impact of the attention shift
proxy is about 10% lower, though still highly statistically and economically significant,
for top pairs consisting of stocks from the same industry. It is considerably lower, though
still significant, for pairs constructed from industry portfolios. The finding of apparently
slow information flow between whole industries complements recent insights from studies
such as Hong et al. (2007) or Menzly and Ozbas (2010).
Please insert table 7
Panel B shows findings from a test similar in nature. While pairs are based on firms
from different industries, some of them operate at the intra-firm level in some common
business segments. The economic link for these pairs will arguably be more visible, which
makes it comparatively less likely that shocks in limited attention will cause prices to
diverge. We follow Berger and Ofek (1995) and Cohen and Lou (2011) to extract data
from relevant segment reporting regulations which start in 1977. Findings reported in
panel B provide supportive, although not persistently significant results.
Press coverage The extent of a firm’s media coverage appears positively linked to
the speed of information diffusion as well as visibility (e.g. Peress (2008), Fang and Peress
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(2009), Huberman and Regev (2001)). Therefore, press coverage could help to keep relative
prices in line, especially in turbulent moments.
We rely on the Dow Jones News Service (DJNS) database, “the best approximation of
public news for traders” (Chan (2003), p. 230), to identify highly and lowly covered pairs.12
Panel C of table 7 shows that our predictions largely prove to be true. The one-month
return difference between pairs receiving disproportionately much coverage and those
widely neglected reaches at least 80 basis points. In fact, trading highly covered pairs turns
out to be completely unprofitable, whereas trading lowly covered pairs is considerably
more profitable compared to trading the average pair. Moreover the sensitivity to changes
in the level of investor attention is higher for lowly covered pairs.
5. Conclusion
Understanding how markets process information is one of the major concerns of financial
economics. Our insights are broadly in line with the idea of time-varying investor attention
allocation being an important source of friction in the price formation process.
The magnitude of phenomena likely to be driven by slow diffusion of information
appears negatively related to investor attention. This holds true both for individual stocks,
as in the case of the PEAD, and for the relative efficiency of economically linked stocks,
as in the case of pairs trading. This mechanism might also be interpreted by referring to
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980): in moments in which gathering and correctly processing
valuable firm-specific information is particularly costly, the market has to provide higher
payoffs as compensation. In contrast, the magnitude of overreaction-driven anomalies such
as arguably momentum might be positively related to the extent of investor attention.
Attention then may exacerbate behavioral biases, thereby amplifying seemingly abnormal
returns. Any competing interpretation faces the hurdle of convincingly explaining these
contrasting effects as well as their robustness and economic magnitude.
12For each firm that meets the data requirements on pairs trading at some point after 1990, we collect the yearly number
of news articles between 1991 and 2008. As this number is strongly positively related to firm size (e.g. Fang and Peress
(2009)), we use the top and bottom quintile of residuals from yearly regressions of ln(1+number of news) on ln(average
market capitalization). Finally, we define a pair as being highly (lowly) covered, if both of its components are firms with
high (low) coverage in the year the divergence occurs.
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Figure 1: Return anomalies following investor attention shifts
This figure compares the average magnitude of different return anomalies conditioned on lagged values of the
baseline attention shift proxy proposed in this paper. The proxy is based on the dispersion of unanticipated
daily industry return shocks. Details are provided in Section 2.. For each year separately, a decile-based rank
is assigned to each trading day. In the case of the PEAD as well as pairs trading, high (low) distraction days
are defined as decile rank 10 (1). In the case of momentum, average monthly values of the daily attention shift
proxy are computed. For each year separately, a rank from 1 to 6 is then assigned to two months each. High
(low) distraction months are defined as rank 6 (1). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. In the case of the PEAD as well as pairs trading, standard errors
are clustered by day. In the case of momentum, statistical inferences are based on Gallant (1987) standard errors.
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Figure 2: Time-Series Characteristics of the Attention Shift Proxy: High and Low Distraction Days
The graph shows the monthly number of high and low distraction days proxy from January 1962 to December
2008. For the construction of the time-series, a four-step procedure is employed. First, for January 1960 to
December 2008, we compute daily value-weighted returns for the 49 Fama and French (1997) industries. Second,
we construct daily return shocks defined as the absolute difference between the actual industry return and its
expected return as implied by an OLS market model. Parameter estimates are obtained from rolling time-series
regressions based on daily return data over the previous year. Third, shocks are condensed into a single ratio. To
this end, industry shocks are weighted by the inverse of the volatility of their shock variable over the previous
year. Fourth, we assign a decile-based rank to each trading day for each year separately. Days with decile rank
10 (1) are referred to as high (low) distraction days.
Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between the decile ranks of the attention shift proxy and the rank
order of market-level variables based on daily data are as follows. The first number refers to the raw value of
the market-level variables, the second to their yearly decile rank (computed as for the attention shift proxy).
The sample period comprises all trading days between January 1962 and December 2008.
Market excess return Small firm factor Value/growth factor Momentum factor Short-term reversal factor
0.04/0.07 -0.08/-0.06 -0.00/-0.00 -0.12/-0.10 0.03/0.00
Average bid-ask spread Squared market return Equal-weighted turnover Rolling 10 day volatility
0.15/0.08 0.14/0.23 0.14/0.25 0.22/0.27
Details on the construction of the following variables are given in the appendix.
TED Spread (since 1/1986) VIX (since 1/1990) Moody’s BAA-AAA (since 1/1986)
0.12/0.12 0.23/0.31 0.08/0.15
LIBOR 3M (since 1/1986) Term Spread (since 1/1982) IB Abnormal Return (since 1/1982)
-0.01/-0.05 0.02/0.02 0.05/0.04
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Figure 3: Illustration of Pairs Trading Process
This figure illustrates the trading process with two examples. Each month, the 100 pairs with minimum distance
between normalized twelve-month daily return indices are selected. They are then eligible for trading in the
immediately following six-month evaluation period. At the beginning of this period, prices are set to equal unity.
If the spread between the cumulative return series of the two stocks exceeds two historical standard deviations
(as estimated in the estimation period), we take a long position in the relatively underpriced stock, which is
financed by short-selling the relatively overpriced stock. The self-financing pair is then held for up to one month.
If prices converge before this cut-off date, the trade is closed with a gain. If prices do not converge within a
month, positions are offset, which results in a loss if prices diverge even further. A pair may open several more
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Figure 4: Probability of Convergence and Average Daily Return by Event Day
The upper graph shows the empirical probability of US stock pairs converging on a given event day after
divergence. See Section 4.1. for a definition of divergence and convergence. The lower graph shows the average
daily return of open pairs in event time. Both figures are based on more than 100,000 round-trip trades between
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Table 1: Post-earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD) and Attention shifts
This table summarizes the main findings from an analysis intended to explore the ability of the attention shift
proxy decile ranks to predict the PEAD. Displayed are selected coefficients from multivariate regressions of
pooled cumulative abnormal returns over days t=2 to t=60 after earnings announcements (t=0) on quarterly
computed earnings surprise decile ranks (ES), attention shift proxy decile ranks, the interaction effect as the
main variable of interest, and up to five sets of control variables. All controls are also interacted with earnings
surprise decile ranks (see equation 3). Quarterly earnings announcement data from the I/B/E/S details tape and
Compustat are obtained for the period between January 1995 and December 2008. We only consider firms with
a market capitalization larger than the first NYSE decile and a stock price larger than 5 USD at the beginning
of the previous month. Please refer to Section 3.1. for a detailed description of further filter rules aiming at
minimizing the impact of possible data errors or microstructural effects. Earnings surprises are based on scaled
deviations of actual earnings from the analyst consensus, as described in detail in Section 3.1.. Cumulative
abnormal returns are computed as the raw buy-and-hold return of the stock over the event window minus its
expected buy-and-hold beta-adjusted return. In panel A, we consider the following firm−level controls: market
capitalization, industry membership, market-to-book ratio, the Campbell et al. (2008) distress measure, the daily
bid-ask spread measure of Corwin and Schultz (2012), the number of analysts, parameters from the estimation of
expected returns (beta, alpha, coefficient of determination), turnover, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, share
price, dummies for Nasdaq and S&P 500 membership, dummies for lottery and non-lottery stocks as in Kumar
(2009), idiosyncratic volatility, and the reporting lag. Details regarding the construction are reported in the
appendix. In panel B, we (additionally) control for time-series variables. Previous attention proxies contain
a Friday dummy, deciles for the number of same-day earnings announcements, and a dummy for a positive
cumulative three-year market return. Calendar effects include dummies for the year of the announcement, the
month of the year, as well as the day of the week. Market− level controls and controls for limits to arbitrage
are explained in detail in Section 2.3.. They include the Fama and French (1993) factor, a momentum factor, a
factor for short-term reversal, the squared market return, market turnover, rolling 10-day volatility, a measure
for the market-wide bid-ask spread, investment bank abnormal returns, the 3-month LIBOR, the TED spread,
a credit spread factor, the term spread, and the VIX. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustered by day of pair divergence. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: The interaction between attention shifts and the PEAD, cross-sectional controls
Model specification All earnings suprises Only surprise deciles 1 and 10
Univariate All firm controls Univariate All firms controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attention shift proxy decile rank 0.0433 0.000361 0.00660 -0.0349
(0.64) (0.01) (0.06) (-0.32)
Earnings surprise decile rank (ES) 0.249*** 0.364 0.191** 0.675
(4.63) (0.53) (2.36) (0.70)
ES x Attention shift proxy decile rank 0.0147* 0.0270*** 0.0269** 0.0372***
(1.68) (3.04) (2.05) (2.82)
Constant -2.066*** -10.45** -1.571** -17.08**
(-4.78) (-2.24) (-2.30) (-2.35)
Observations 101,812 101,812 20,342 20,342
R-squared 0.003 0.023 0.006 0.031
Panel B: The interaction between attention shifts and the PEAD, further controls
Model specification All earnings suprises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ES x Attention shift proxy decile rank 0.0286*** 0.0207** 0.0317*** 0.0374***
(3.00) (2.36) (2.98) (3.54)
Previous attention proxies no no yes yes
Calender effects yes no yes yes
Market-level controls no no yes yes
Limits to arbitrage no yes yes yes
Firm-level controls no no no yes
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Table 2: Momentum Returns and Attention Shifts
This table reports the main findings from time-series regressions of the monthly returns of a composite
momentum strategy on one-month lagged attention shift ranks (1-6) and on a number of control variables.
Attention shift ranks are computed in two steps. First, average monthly values of the baseline (daily) attention
shift proxy as described in section 2.1. are computed. Second, for each year separately, these monthly values are
sorted in ascending order and assigned values from 1 to 6. Thus, two months in each year are assigned the same
attention shift rank. The returns of the composite momentum strategy are expressed in percent per month and
determined as the equal-weighted returns of fourteen (enhanced) momentum strategies, as described in detail
in Section 3.2. and the appendix. Individual momentum strategies are computed using a formation period of
six months, a skipped month, and a holding period of six months with overlapping portfolios. Stocks eligible
for entering any momentum strategy are required to have a nominal share price of at least 5 USD and a market
capitalization larger than the first NYSE decile at the time of portfolio formation. Returns of each individual
momentum-strategy are value-weighted. Model 1 does not contain any further variables. Model 2 includes the
Fama and French (1993) factors. Model 3 to 6 augment model 2 with further control variables. In model 3, these
comprise factors for short term reversal, long term reversal, and liquidity. They moreover include the squared
market return, market turnover, market volatility, and average bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012).
In model 4, these comprise the 3 month LIBOR, the TED spread, a credit spread based on differences in
corporate bond rates, the term spread, and a measure building on abnormal stock returns of investment banks.
Model 5 is model 4 plus the average monthly value of the VIX. Model 6 includes controls for market state, past
market volatility, return dispersion, co-momentum, and investor sentiment, as described in detail in Section
3.2. and the appendix. T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
(Gallant (1987)). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations 564 564 492 276 156 522
Sample Start Jan-62 Jan-62 Jan-68 Jan-86 Jan-93 Jul-65
Sample End Dec-08 Dec-08 Dec-08 Dec-08 Dec-05 Dec-08
Lagged attention shift rank (1-6) -0.279*** -0.319*** -0.282** -0.642*** -0.772*** -0.379***
(-2.78) (-3.05) (-2.32) (-4.69) (-4.82) (-3.63)
Attributable to long leg 32% 40% 38% 42% 43% 44%
R-squared 0.013 0.074 0.174 0.162 0.145 0.083
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Stock and Pair Characteristics by Distraction Deciles
In panel A, NY SE/AMEX macap decile refers to the firm’s market capitalization decile rank computed at
the beginning of the pair’s six-month trading period. Amihud illiquidity ratio is computed as the average of
a stock’s absolute daily return divided by its total daily trading volume in millions of dollars. The estimation
period for the illiquidity ratio, for average daily turnover as well as for idiosyncratic risk is the twelve-month
period ending at the beginning of a pair’s trading period. Idiosyncratic risk is computed as the standard
deviation of the residual obtained from time series regressions of a stock’s daily return on factors for the market
premium, size, value and momentum. Bid− ask spread is computed following the methodology in Corwin and
Schultz (2012). Maximum industry weight denotes the largest fraction of sample firms belonging to a specific
industry group (out of the 49 Fama/French industries). Industry concentration is computed as the sum of
squared industry weights. In panel B, the first four rows report within-pair differences of stock characteristics,
which are computed as in panel A. The last column reports differences in mean characteristics between decile
10 and decile 1. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Variable All Decile 1 Decile 10 10-1 (Mean)
Panel A: Firm Characteristics by Distraction Deciles
NYSE/AMEX macap decile Mean 8.86 8.85 8.86 0.0189
Median 9 9 9
Amihud illiquidity ratio Mean 0.0578 0.0567 0.0566 -0.0002
Median 0.01 0.0107 0.0094
Average daily turnover Mean 0.16% 0.16% 0.17% 0.008%
Median 0.11% 0.11% 0.11%
Idiosyncratic risk Mean 1.12% 1.10% 1.13% 0.032%**
Median 1.06% 1.05% 1.07%
Turnover on day of divergence Mean 0.25% 0.21% 0.30% 0.09%***
Median 0.08% 0.11% 0.15%
Bid-ask spread on day of divergence Mean 0.44% 0.39% 0.52% 0.13%***
Median 0.32% 0.31% 0.32%
No. industry groups 49 49 49
Maximum industry weight Fraction 29.14% 29.20% 29.53%
Industry Utilities
Industry concentration 0.114 0.115 0.115
S&P 500 dummy 0.54% 0.54 0.54 0.00
Panel B: Pair Characteristics by Distraction Deciles
Macap decile difference Mean 1.25 1.25 1.24 -0.0052
Median 1 1 1
Average daily turnover difference Mean 0.072% 0.072% 0.073% -0.00%
Median 0.040% 0.040% 0.039%
Amihud illiquidity ratio difference Mean 0.063 0.061 0.061 -0.000
Median 0.013 0.0130 0.0130
Idiosyncratic risk difference Mean 0.248% 0.237% 0.252% 0.015%***
Median 0.20% 0.19% 0.20%
Turnover difference on day of divergence Mean 0.23% 0.05% 0.26% 0.21%***
Median 0.08% 0.07% 0.09%
Bid-ask spread difference on day of divergence Mean 0.62% 0.54% 0.76% 0.22%***
Median 0.43% 0.41% 0.45%
Cumulative price difference upon divergence Mean 6.68% 6.44% 7.04% 0.60%***
Median 6.28% 6.05% 6.58%
Return difference at day of divergence Mean 2.84% 2.38% 3.59% 1.21%***
Median 2.29% 1.93% 2.89%
No. industry group combinations 931 623 697
Maximum industry group weight Fraction 15.89% 16.04% 15.13%
Industries Utilities/Communication
Industry group concentration 0.039 0.041 0.037
S&P 500 dummy difference 0.44 0.44 0.44
No. round-trip trades 103,386 8,187 14,011 5,824
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Table 4: Pairs trading and Attention shifts: US evidence
This table explores the impact of attention shifts (as measured on the day of divergence) on event-time one-month returns on zero-cost portfolios of US stock pairs.
Breakpoints for the deciles are determined separately for each year. Calculations are based on daily data from January 1962 to December 2008. Trading positions in each
pair are initiated on the day following the convergence and liquidated on the day following convergence or after one month has passed, respectively. Panel A presents
univariate findings. Panel B displays findings from multivariate regressions. The dependent variable of interest is either the attention shift proxy decile rank or a high/low
distraction dummy, which is zero for low distraction days (decile 1) and one for high distraction days (decile 10). We consider up to three control sets. The first set controls
for calendar and industry effects (indicator variables for year, month, day of week, and pair industry group combinations). The second set controls for market-level conditions
on the day of divergence (market return, squared market return, market turnover, 10-day rolling volatility, average bid-ask spread, factors for daily return premia on size,
value, momentum and short-term reversal). The third set controls for a number of pair characteristics computed as outlined in table 2 (average firm market capitalization
decile rank, ln (average pre-event turnover), ln (average turnover on day of divergence), ln (average pre-event Amihud illiquidity ratio), average idiosyncratic risk, ln
(bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012), S&P 500 dummy, within-pair differences of the just mentioned variables, and return difference attributable to the day of
divergence. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Panel A: Average One-Month Return on US stock pairs (1/1962-12/2008), Univariate Regressions
Attention shift decile All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Diff 10-1
Return on pairs 0.97%*** 0.53%*** 0.86%*** 0.77%*** 0.87%*** 0.95%*** 0.94%*** 1.02%*** 1.10%*** 1.09%*** 1.30%*** 0.77%***
t-statistic (30.41) (5.14) (9.00) (7.89) (8.81) (9.50) (9.04) (9.62) (12.00) (11.25) (13.13) (5.28)
% of convergence 36.3% 33.4% 34.3% 34.3% 34.7% 36.2% 36.1% 35.8% 37.6% 38.1% 39.7% 6.3%***
(Return|convergence) 6.42%*** 6.14%*** 6.29%*** 6.33%*** 6.24%*** 6.33%*** 6.37%*** 6.53%*** 6.39%*** 6.51%*** 6.71*** 0.56%***
(Return|no convergence) -2.08%*** -2.24%*** -1.94%*** -2.11%*** -1.95%*** -2.08%*** -2.09%*** -2.01%*** -2.02%*** -2.17%*** -2.13%*** 0.11%
Observations 103,386 8,187 8,679 9,146 9,398 10,048 10,079 10,595 11,019 12,224 14,011 5,824
Panel B: Average One-Month Return on US stock pairs (1/1962-12/2008), Multivariate Regressions
Dependent variable of interest Attention Shift Proxy Decile Rank High/Low Distraction Dummy
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations 103,386 103,386 103,386 22,198 22,198 22,198
R2 0.0355 0.0368 0.0375 0.089 0.091 0.094
Coefficient 0.065*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.732*** 0.534*** 0.501***
t-statistic (6.18) (3.49) (3.33) (5.19) (3.27) (3.03)
Calender and industry controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Market-level conditions no yes yes no yes yes
Firm and pair characteristics no no yes no no yes
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Table 5: Pairs Trading and Attention Shifts: International Evidence
This table reports monthly event-time returns from pairs trading in international stock markets. The computation of the country-specific attention shift proxies relies on
the 10 GICS industry sectors. For the country-specific monthly top 100 pairs, we discard all stocks with at least one missing return or at least two zero/missing trading
volume days within the twelve-month estimation period. Apart from that, the methodology is the same as in the baseline analysis for the US market (see panel A table
4). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustered by day of pair divergence.
Japan UK France Germany Switzerland Italy Netherlands Hongkong
Panel A: One Day Waiting, Full Sample Period (1962-2008)
Time Period 1/1995-12/2009 1/1995-12/2009 1/1996-12/2009 1/1996-12/2009 6/1997-12/2009 6/1995-12/2009 1/1995-12/2009 1/1995-12/2009
Observations 36,992 27,185 25,833 26,006 16,841 25,596 21,320 20,894
Panel A: One-month Pairs Trading Abnormal Returns
Pairs Trading Returns: All 1.03%*** 0.73%*** 1.11%*** 1.09%*** 0.54%*** 0.48%*** 0.82%*** 1.00%***
(17.02) (9.58) (13.03) (10.38) (4.15) (4.10) (7.39) (4.48)
Pairs Trading Returns: Decile 1 1.19%*** 0.28% 0.79%*** 0.61%* -0.65% 0.32% 0.37% -0.99%
(6.96) (1.39) (2.93) (1.84) (-1.52) (0.91) (1.18) (-1.46)
Pairs Trading Returns: Decile 10 1.38%*** 1.42%*** 1.73%*** 2.04%*** 1.71%*** 0.66% 2.03%*** 2.63%***
(7.01) (5.80) (6.34) (6.30) (3.35) (1.44) (5.94) (4.38)
Diff 10-1 0.19% 1.14%*** 0.94%** 1.14%*** 2.37%*** 0.34% 1.66%*** 0.0362***
(0.00260) (0.00316) (0.00383) (0.00463) (0.00664) (0.00577) (0.00463) (0.00906)
Panel B: Fraction of Convergence
% of Convergence: All 44.8% 28.9% 29.6% 29.6% 19.5% 26.7% 23.2% 23.1%
% of Convergence: Decile 1 43.8% 25.6% 26.9% 27.0% 14.8% 25.0% 20.9% 15.9%
% of Convergence: Decile 10 49.1% 34.1% 32.8% 32.2% 24.4% 30.0% 30.1% 29.8%
Diff 10-1 5.37%*** 8.50%*** 5.89%*** 5.14%*** 9.65%*** 5.00%*** 9.20%*** 13.9%***
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
This table presents results from various robustness checks. Panel A displays subperiod results from the baseline
approach. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair
divergence. In Panel B, the process of identifying the monthly top 100 pairs is modified. Excluding utility firms
means we do not consider any pair with at least one firm belonging to Fama/French (1997) industry group 31.
Only different firms means we do not select a pair if at least one of the firms is already a component of
any higher-ranked pair. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by
day of pair divergence. Panel C shows results for same pairs, i.e. a subsample of pairs that diverge both at
least once on a high distraction day and on a low distraction day. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence. Panel D shows findings for the subsample of
pairs that diverge on days with positive market returns or have below median idiosyncratic risk. Cut-offs for
idiosyncratic risk are determined separately for each year, and are based on all pairs that start trading in the
year under consideration. Panel E shows alphas obtained from calendar time-series regressions of the difference
in pairs trading returns on well-established risk factors. The 3 factor model (1/1962-12/2008) includes the Fama
and French (1993) factors, the 7 factor model (1/1968-12/2008) additionally controls for short-term reversal,
long-term reversal, momentum, and liquidity. Panel F reports results from Fama/MacBeth-type regressions. We
first estimate yearly pooled cross-sectional regressions of one-month pairs returns on distraction decile ranks
and then use the time-series of resulting coefficients to assess the statistical significance of the attention shift
proxy. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Subperiod Analysis
Attention Shift Decile: All Attention Shift Decile: 1 Attention Shift Decile: 10 Difference: 10-1
Subperiod: 1962-1977 1.49%*** 1.04%*** 1.77%*** 0.73%***
(29.16) (6.01) (11.57) (3.16)
Subperiod: 1978-1993 1.09%*** 0.71%*** 1.29%*** 0.59%**
(20.64) (4.06) (7.54) (2.41)
Subperiod: 1994-2008 0.24%*** -0.25% 0.79%*** 1.04***%
(4.01) (-1.44) (4.22) (4.08)
Panel B: Variations in the Data Set (Monthly Top 100 Pairs)
Attention Shift Decile: All Attention Shift Decile: 1 Attention Shift Decile: 10 Difference: 10-1
Excluding utility firms 1.20%*** 0.59%*** 1.35%*** 0.76%***
(38.71) (5.78) (13.92) (7.45)
Only different firms 1.08%*** 0.79%*** 1.44%*** 0.65%***
(37.24) (8.68) (16.55) (5.00)
Panel C: Limitation to Firms that Diverge both at Least Once on High and Low Distraction Days
Attention Shift Decile: All Attention Shift Decile: 1 Attention Shift Decile: 10 Difference: 10-1
Same pairs 2.02%*** 1.40%*** 2.13%*** 0.73%***
(33.06) (7.87) (13.31) (3.05)
Panel D: Limitation to Subsamples with Low Limits to Arbitrage
Attention Shift Decile: All Attention Shift Decile: 1 Attention Shift Decile: 10 Difference: 10-1
Positive market return 0.97%*** 0.53%*** 1.38%*** 0.85%***
(22.03) (3.73) (11.75) (4.56)
Below median idiosyncratic risk 0.82%*** 0.33%*** 1.17%*** 0.74%***
(19.84) (3.37) (9.71) (3.37)
Panel E: Alphas from Calendar Time Regressions on Risk Factors
3 factor model 0.30%**
(2.19)
6 factor model 0.29%**
(2.04)
Panel F: Alternative Regression Approach
Coefficient on attention 0.57%***
shift decile rank (37.77)
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Table 7: Cross-sectional Tests: Attention Shifts and Pairs Trading Profitability
Panel A shows the sensitivity of pairs trading returns to attention shift proxy decile ranks (as observed on
the day of divergence) for several samples of top pairs: The monthly top 100 pairs each consisting of firms
from different industries, the monthly top 100 pairs each consisting of firms from the same industries, and the
monthly top 20 pairs each consisting of two value-weighted industries. In all cases, we use the Fama/French
(1997) classification with 49 industries. The first column shows the return difference between pairs diverging
on high distraction days (decile 10) and pairs diverging on low distraction days (decile 1), as quantified by
including the high/low distraction dummy. The approach resembles the methodology used in panel A of table 4.
The second column shows findings from regressing pairs returns on the attention shift proxy decile rank. Panel
B reports results from a test similar in fashion. It compares the return sensitivity for pairs of which constituent
firms share (do not share) at least one business segment, as described in detail in Section 4.4.. Panel C compares
returns from pairs consisting only of firms with high residual media coverage and pairs consisting only of firms
with low residual media coverage, as described in detail in Section 4.4.. The first column compares average
event-time one-month pairs trading returns. The second column shows findings from regressing pairs returns
on the attention shift proxy decile rank. In all panels, statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Panel A: Impact of Investor Distraction on Pairs Consisting of Alternative Assets
High/Low Distraction Dummy Distraction Decile Rank
Top 100 pairs with stocks 0.77*** 0.065***
from different industries (N=103,386) (5.28) (9.15)
Top 100 pairs with stocks 0.71*** 0.057***
from the same industry (N=100,726) (5.92) (6.13)
Top 20 industry-level pairs 0.39** 0.033**
(N=14,180) (2.15) (2.36)
Panel B: Pairs With and Without Common Industry Segments (since 1977)
High/Low Distraction Dummy Distraction Decile Rank
No shared industry segment 0.97*** 0.073***
(4.22) (4.06)
Shared industry segment 0.84** 0.019
(about 18% of observations) (2.15) (0.63)
Difference 0.13 0.054*
(0.34) (1.86)
Panel C: Pairs with High and Low Residual Media Coverage
Return: All Deciles Attention Shift Decile Rank
Low residual media coverage 0.77*** 0.010*
(4.81) (0.17)
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This appendix contains test, figures, and tables that supplement the analysis in the
paper.
A. Data sets and variable descriptions Table 1 gives an overview of the data
samples used in the study. Table 2 describes the construction of selected variables relied
on in the paper.
B. Attention Shift Proxy In appendix B.1, we explore the relationship between
the attention shift proxy proposed in the paper and alternative measures of attention
allocation. The latter include firm-level residual turnover, the Hirshleifer et al. (2009)
distraction measure, New York Times front page articles about the stock market, new
record levels of the Dow, as well as shocks in internet search queries.
Subsequently, the appendix displays several figures intended to give additional infor-
mation on the baseline attention shift proxy used in the paper. The proxy relies on the
Fama and French (1997) industries as a classifications scheme for market segments. Figure
1 shows the time-series of weighted abnormal industry-level returns, i.e. the result after
step three of the construction process for the attention shift proxy. Figures 2 to 4 illus-
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trate the relationship between specific characteristics of abnormal industry-level returns
and resulting attention shift decile ranks.
Table 3 gives an overview over the twelve modified attention shift proxies. Table 4
provides a transition matrix between baseline attention shift decile ranks and the decile
ranks of a modified proxy available in real time.
C. Momentum strategies
This section provides more information on the fourteen individual momentum ap-
proaches suggested by previous work, which are relied on in the paper.
D. Pairs Trading
Appendix D.1 verifies that the future earnings surprises of the monthly top 100 pairs
are significantly correlated, suggesting that these firms are not only statistically, but also
fundamentally linked.
Appendix D.2, which includes table 5, provides further time-series insights into the
role of limited attention. It explores the role of previously proposed attention proxies on
the profitability of pairs trading. These proxies include Fridays, down market periods, the
number of competing events, shocks in internet search queries consistently, and holidays.
Appendix D.3 explores the impact of time-varying arbitrage risk on pairs trading prof-
itability. To this end, it starts with a short description of the arbitrage risk proxies em-
ployed. Table 6 then displays findings from univariate regressions of the one-month return
on zero-cost US stock pairs on these proxies. Table 7 shows pairwise correlations between
these arbitrage proxies and attention shift proxy decile ranks. Tables 8 and 9 show find-
ings from multivariate regressions of pairs trading profits on arbitrage risk proxies, the
high/low distraction dummy, and a set of control variables.
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Figure 5 shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of the return on US stock
pairs sorted by attention shift proxy decile ranks as observed on the day of divergence.
Figure 6 shows results from a replication of the baseline analysis (see figure 1 and table 4
in the paper) when relying on in total twelve modified distraction proxies.
Table 10 reports distribution details of the return on US stock pairs sorted by at-
tention shift proxy decile ranks as observed on the day of divergence. Table 11 displays
corresponding performance measures. Table 12 shows the impact of modified attention
shift proxies on pairs trading profitability. Table 13 shows differences between the return
on pairs diverging on high and low distraction days when conditioned on the level of
the return differential on the day of divergence. Table 14 shows the full list of regression
coefficients for pair-level and market-level variables from table 4 in the paper. Table 15
provides descriptive statistics for pairs trading samples in international stock markets.
References are provided on the last three pages.
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A Data Sets and Variable Descriptions
Table 1: Overview of Data Sets Used in the Study
Data Source Description Sample Period
CRSP Daily and monthly stock market data for all US firms
trading on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ




Daily stock market data for firms of eight large non-North
American stock markets (Japan, UK, France, Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, Netherlands, Hongkong)
Middle of the 1990ies - De-
cember 2009










Index membership Varying - 2008
Compustat Supplemental
Short Interest File
Short Interest 1973 - 2008
Factiva Yearly number of Dow Jones News Services articles about
each firm that meets data requirements on pairs trading
in some period after 1990
1991-2008
IBES (Detail and summary
tape)
Analyst earnings forecasts/revisions, earnings announce-
ment dates (detail tape), number of analysts following
(summary tape)
Varying - December 2008
Federal Reserve Board H15
release
Several interest rates (such as Moody’s corporate bond
rates)
1982 - December 2008
Kenneth R. French’s Data
Library




Various control factors (such as the VIX) Varying - December 2008
Lexisnexis Front-page articles of the New York Times January 1980 - December
2008
Dow Jones Dow Jones Industrial Average on a daily basis January 1960 - December
2007
NBER US business cycle expansions and contractions based on
monthly data
January 1960 - December
2008
Google Standardized weekly time-series of search frequencies
for ticker symbols and other terms, constructed from
Google’s application “Insights for Search”
January 2004 - December
2008
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Table 2: Description of selected variables
Distress risk Our measure of distress risk is based on Campbell et al. (2008), who use a dynamic
logit model based on a broad set of accounting and market variables to empirically
quantify a firm’s failure probability. We follow the implementation used in Stambaugh
et al. (2012) and described in detail in the appendix of Chen et al. (2011).
(Non-)lottery stocks We follow Kumar (2009) in defining a (non)-lottery type stock as one with above
(below) median idiosyncratic volatility, above (below) median idiosyncratic skewness,
and below (above) median nominal stock price.
Reporting lag (PEAD) The reporting lag is computed as ln(1+number of day from the quarter-end to the
actual earnings announcement date).
Daily bid-ask spread We follow the computation proposed in Corwin and Schultz (2012) (see equations 14
and 18 in their paper).
Market to book ratio We rely on quarterly computed book value as described in detail in Chen et al. (2011).
Idiosyncratic volatility We measure idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the residual obtained
from regressing a stock’s excess return on a Carhart (1997) factor model. We rely




The market state is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the cumulative
market return over the previous 36 months was negative.
Market volatility (momen-
tum analysis)
Market volatility is estimated from the previous 36 monthly returns.
Co-momentum measure The co-momentum measure is inspired by recent work of Lou and Polk (2012). In
each month, we sort stocks into deciles based on their cumulative return over month
t-7 to month t-2. We require stocks to have a market capitalization greater than the
first NYSE decile as well as stock price of at least 5 USD at the time of portfolio
formation. We then restrict the sample to those stocks that a typical momentum
trading strategy would bet. We do so by excluding firms contained in deciles 2 to 9.
For each of the remaining stocks (i.e. those contained in deciles 1 and 10), we compute
daily residual returns over months t-7 to t-2 relative to a Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model. For decile 1 and 10 separately, we measure the average correlation
of the residual return of a given stock with all other stocks in the momentum decile in
question. This leads to two separate co-momentum measures (in month t) for winner
stocks as well as for loser stocks.
5
B Attention Shift Proxy
B.1 Attention shift proxy and alternative measures of attention allocation
The goal of the following tests is to further explore whether the novel attention shift proxy
proposed in the paper is able to capture short-term investor attention shifts. To this end,
we investigate the interaction of the proxy with the following variables: Average daily
residual firm-specific turnover, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) distraction measure, New York
Times front-page articles about the stock market, record levels for the Dow, and shocks
in internet search queries. We describe these tests one by one.
Residual firm specific turnover For January 1960 to December 2008, we compute
daily turnover shocks at the firm-level, thereby taking into account all common shares
traded on NYSE, Amex or Nasdaq. Turnover shocks (TSi,t) for firm i at day t are defined
as the difference between actual turnover (Ti,t) and expected turnover. Expected turnover
is based on the intercept and coefficients obtained from regressing a stock’s daily turnover
on the value-weighted market turnover and the relevant value-weighted Fama and French
(1997) industry turnover. Note that this approach is an extension of the turnover market
model brought forward in e.g. Tkac (1999) or Lo and Wang (2000). The sample period
for this regression are the twelve months ending one month prior to day t, i.e. we skip
one month between estimation and evaluation period. In sum, turnover shocks TSi,t are
computed for each firm and day separately as follows:
TSi,t = Ti,t − α̂i,t − β̂1i,tTurnovermarket,t − β̂2i,tTurnoverindustry,t (1)
Based on this estimate, we equally weight all measures for a given day to obtain av-
erage firm-level residual turnover. We expect a negative relation between the attention
shift proxy proposed in the paper and average firm-level residual turnover: If investors
focus primarily on aggregate information (high distraction days, decile rank 10) and thus
exhibit category learning behavior, average firm-level residual turnover, which controls
for market-level and sector-level turnover, should be low. In contrast, if investors devote
much attention to individual firms (low distraction days, decile rank 1), average firm-level
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residual turnover should be high.1
We explore this relationship in different ways. To keep the analysis as intuitive and
simple as possible, we start by performing independent yearly decile sorts of the firm-level
residual turnover measure. This approach is identical to the construction of the attention
shift proxy. It turns out that the average decile rank of the firm-level turnover measure is
6.23 on low distraction days, but only 4.43 on high distraction days. In other words, truly
firm-specific turnover is higher on low distraction days, as expected. As the following table
shows, these findings become stronger if we restrict the focus to high firm-level turnover
days (decile 10) and low firm-level turnover days (decile 1).
Turnover measure
Attention shift proxy Low firm-level turnover High firm-level turnover Total
Low distraction day 29.02% 70.98% 100%
High distraction day 75.25% 24.75% 100%
Total 60.40% 39.60% 100%
While low distraction days tend to be at the same time high firm-level turnover days
as opposed to low-firm turnover days (71% to 29% likelihood), the opposite is true for
high distraction days (25% to 75% likelihood).
Finally, we verify these insights in a more formal regression approach. We regress the
attention shift decile ranks or the high/low distraction dummy on raw values of average
firm-specific residual turnover or on its decile ranks. In some specifications, we also include
year dummies and the market return. Inferences remain unchanged if we add further
market-level controls, such as volatility or squared market returns. In all regressions, the
sample period is January 1962 to December 2008.
1Note that the focus on the residual measure is crucial here. The market turnover itself is positively related to attention
shift decile ranks, as described in detail in the paper.
7
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attention shift decile ranks High/low distraction proxy
Firm-specific residual turnover (raw) -493.24*** -620.05*** -135.65*** -170.90***
(-9.86) (-9.87) (-7.03) (-6.71)
Firm-specific residual turnover (deciles) -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.05*** -0.05***
(-19.98) (-19.18) (-15.71) (-15.18)
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Market return No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 1.07% 3.32% 2.92% 2.92% 0.14% 0.18% 2.16% 2.16%
Across all specifications, there is a significant negative relationship between attention
towards firm specific information, as quantified with the novel proxy proposed in the
paper, and average firm-level residual turnover. To sum up, these findings are consistent
with the idea that the attention shift proxy picks up actual investor attention allocation.
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) distraction measure
We closely follow the approach proposed in Hirshleifer et al. (2009). From July 1971 on,
we gather the daily number of earnings announcements as accessible via Compustat. We
then perform quarterly independent decile sorts to obtain a measure of inattention towards
firm-level information. A high value (decile rank 10) suggests that only few resources are
available to process the information contained in each individual earnings announcement.
We run similar tests as outlined above for the case of residual firm-specific turnover.
The average decile rank of the Hirshleifer et al. (2009) distraction measure is 4.76 on
low distraction days, but 5.93 on high distraction days. In other words, both distraction
proxies tend to identify similar situations. These findings become stronger if we restrict
our focus to Hirshleifer (2009) et al. high distraction days (decile 10) and low distraction
days (decile 1). This can be seen from the following table.
Hirshleifer (2009) et al. distraction measure
Attention shift proxy Low distraction day High distraction day Total
Low distraction day 76.53% 23.47% 100%
High distraction day 38.62% 61.38% 100%
Total 56.21% 43.79% 100%
Low distraction days computed as in Hirshleifer et al. (2009) tend to be at the same
time low distraction days, as quantified with the novel attention shift proxy proposed in
the paper. The combination (low distraction day as in the paper and low distraction day
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as in Hirshleifer et al. (2009)) is more than three times as likely as the combination (low
distraction day as in the paper and high distraction day as in Hirshleifer et al. (2009)).
Similar insights are gained for high distraction days.
Finally, we verify these insights in a more formal regression approach. We regress the
attention shift decile ranks or the high/low distraction dummy on the Hirshleifer et al.
measure. In some specifications, we also include year dummies and the market return.
Inferences remain unchanged if we add further market-level controls. In all regressions,
the sample period is July 1971 to December 2008.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Attention shift decile ranks High/low distraction proxy
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) decile ranks 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(10.37) (10.38) (8.81) (8.89)
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) high/low distraction day 1.26*** 1.26*** 0.38*** 0.38***
(9.25) (9.13) (8.93) (8.42)
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Market return No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 1.16% 4.38% 0.86% 4.54% 3.78% 14.52% 2.02% 14.03%
Across all specifications, there is a significant positive relationship between attention
towards firm specific information, as quantified with the novel proxy proposed in the
paper, and inattention towards valuable firm-level information, as quantified with the
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) distraction measure. Inferences remain unchanged if we restrict
our focus to the time period after 1995, when earnings announcement dates are less likely
to suffer from slight imperfections. To sum up, these findings are consistent with the idea
that the attention shifts proxy picks up actual investor attention allocation.
New York Times Front-Page Articles about the Stock Market
Our goal is to identify articles which satisfy two criteria, as suggested by Yuan (2012):
First, they need to be published on a trading day at the front-page of the New York
Times. Second, they need to deal with the stock market.
We rely on the LexisNexis database, which provides access to the New York Time
archive from 1980 on. Consequently, our sample period is January 1980 to December
2008. We restrict our analysis to articles articles which have been published in section
A/section 1, page 1. The goal of identifying articles that deal with the stock market
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leaves some degrees of freedom. We operationalize this idea by only considering articles
whose headline contains at least one of the words “stocks”, “stock market”, “Dow”. The
use of these three keywords is also motivated by a the application “Google correlate”,
which identifies words with similar time-series behavior in search query frequencies. Our
findings are robust to the use of only a subset of these terms. We have also experimented,
with similar findings, with a broader set of keywords, as in e.g. the “Google trends”
analysis explained below. If anything, the focus on just three keywords is likely to add
additional noise to the analysis, making it more difficult to identify statistically significant
relationships.
We exclude articles that are published on a non-trading day. Articles written on day
t are then matched with trading day t-1. However, findings are also unchanged if we
attribute articles published on day t to trading day t. In total, we are able to identify 331
trading days with stock market articles on the front-page of the New York Times.
The unconditional likelihood of observing such an article on a given day from January
1980 to December 2008 is 4.52%. In contrast, following low (high) distraction days, the
likelihood is 1.99% (12.16%). These insights are also confirmed in the following regressions.
Findings hold if we control for other market-level variables, such as e.g. volatility or
squared market turnover.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Attention shift decile ranks High/low distraction proxy
Dummy for NYT front-page article 1.49*** 1.49*** 0.39*** 0.41***
(9.15) (9.21) (10.50) (10.44)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Market return No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 1.16% 0.79% 3.98% 2.17%
To sum up, findings again are consistent with the idea that the attention shifts proxy
picks up actual investor attention allocation.
Record levels for the Dow
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The Dow Jones Industrial Average is available from CRSP until the end of 2007. Our
sample period is therefore January 1962 to December 2007. As in Yuan (2012), we identify
days on which the Dow reaches a new record level. In total, this happens on 690 days.
On average, a new record level is observed on 5.59% of all trading days. However, the
corresponding values for low and high distraction days are 4.03% and 6.15% respectively.
To the extent that a new record level is a distracting event, these findings thus support the
line of reasoning behind the novel attention shift proxy. These insights are also confirmed
in the following regressions. Findings hold if we control for other market-level variables,
such as e.g. volatility or squared market turnover.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Attention shift decile ranks High/low distraction proxy
Dummy for new record level of the Dow 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.11** 0.11**
(3.66) (3.17) (2.40) (2.19)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Market return No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.24% 0.02% 0.23% -0.03%
To sum up, findings again are consistent with the idea that the attention shifts proxy
picks up actual investor attention allocation.
Shocks in internet search queries
We are interested in whether high (low) distraction days tend to go along with a
comparatively higher (lower) demand for market-level or segment-level information in
relation to firm-specific information. In the following analysis, our measure of information
demand is based on indices of weekly internet search activity obtained from the online
tool Google Insights. In doing so, we build on findings of an emerging literature, which
highlights the ability of such an approach to proxy for (in particular retail) investor
attention allocation (e.g. Da et al. (2011) or Mondria and Wu (2012)).
Google Insights allows to download time-series quantifying the relative importance of
specific search queries entered in google.com from within the United States. This search
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volume index is scaled in the sense that it represents the number of searches for specific
terms relative to all other search terms in Google in the same period. It is moreover
normalized in the sense that the period with the highest relative search volume is assigned
a value of 100. Search volume for the remaining periods can take on values of 0 to 100,
depending on their relative importance within the whole time-series under consideration.
In the following analysis, we use these raw search volume index values. We have verified,
however, that our findings are very similar if we base our tests simply on the rank order of
the index values. The latter procedure tends to give less weight to extreme observations.
The sample period for our analysis is January 2004 to December 2008. The start date is
determined by the availability of Google Insights data. The end date corresponds to the
end of the sample period of our study.
To construct a measure for firm-specific information demand over time, we widely
follow the approach developed in Da et al. (2011). First, we randomly select 100 S&P
500 stocks. Second, for each of these firms, we download the weekly search volume index
of their ticker symbols. Da et al. (2011) argue that people entering ticker symbols into
Google pay direct attention to the firm under consideration and are most likely interested
in gaining more information about its stock. Third, to construct a measure of average
demand for firm-specific information in a given week, we equally weight all non-zero firm-
level observations.
Constructing a sensible measure for sector-level or market-level information demand
over time is arguably more ambiguous. As there appears to be little guidance by previous
literature, we address this issue in two ways. As a parsimonious first approach, we simply
use the search volume index of a term which arguably comes directly to mind: “stock
market”. As a second approach, our main method, we equally weight the search volume
data for seven terms: “stock market”, “Dow”, “market, “S&P”, “stocks, “market index”,
“market segments”. We report results for both approaches separately.
To construct a measure of the relative importance of the demand for information pri-
marily relevant at some aggregate level, we simply divide our weekly proxy for market-level
information by the corresponding value for firm-specific information. Finally, values are
standardized so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation 1. We refer to the
resulting time-series as “internet-based attention allocation proxy”.
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We then regress the time-series of attention proxy decile ranks on this alternative
measure of attention shifts. The following table shows the main findings.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Internet-based attention 0.71*** 0.86*** 0.61*** 0.72*** 0.83*** 0.57***
allocation proxy (4.83) (5.71) (4.30) (4.58) (4.32) (3.84)
Sample start 1/2004 1/2004 1/2004 1/2004 1/2004 1/2004
Sample end 12/2008 12/2008 12/2008 12/2008 12/2008 12/2008
N 251 251 251 251 251 251
Year-fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.19
In Model 1 to 3, we rely on the search volume index for “stock market”, in model 4
to 6, we make use of our richer alternative method to quantify market-level information
demand. Depending on the regression specification, we add no further controls (model 1
and 4), year dummies (model 2 and 5), or additionally controls for the absolute weekly
market return and the average weekly VIX value (model 3 and 6). We have experimented
with further controls, which however did not affect the qualitative nature of our findings.
The displayed coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation change of the internet-
based attention allocation proxy tends to go along with a 0.57 to 0.86 point change in
attention shift proxy decile ranks. These estimates are persistently and highly statistically
significant. To sum up, the findings are consistent with the idea that the proxy picks up
actual investor attention shifts.
13
Figure 1: Time-Series of Weighted Abnormal Industry-Level Returns
The graph shows the time-series of weighted abnormal daily industry-level returns, i.e. the result after step three of the construction process for the attention shift proxy.
For its construction, a three-step procedure is employed. First, for January 1960 to December 2008, we compute daily value-weighted returns for the 49 Fama/French
(1997) industries. Second, we construct daily return shocks defined as the absolute difference between the actual industry return and its expected return as implied by an
OLS market model. Parameter estimates are obtained from rolling time-series regressions based on daily return data over the previous year. Third, shocks are condensed
into a single ratio. To this end, industry shocks are weighted by the inverse of the volatility of their shock variable over the previous year.
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Figure 2: Mean of Abnormal Industry Returns by Attention Shift Proxy Decile Ranks
The following figures are intended to illustrate the relationship between specific characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting attention shift proxy decile ranks. To this end, we compute, at each day, the
mean of different types of abnormal industry returns, where industries are represented by the 49 Fama/French
(1997) segments. The upper graph uses (raw) abnormal returns, the middle graph uses absolute abnormal
returns, and the lower graph uses weighted absolute abnormal returns, where industry weights are determined
by the inverse of the volatility of their shock variables over the previous year. See section 2 of the paper for
a detailed description of how abnormal returns and weights are computed. By attention shift proxy decile
ranks, the boxes illustrate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the time-series of the mean of these abnormal
returns. The adjacent values in the box plot are the most extreme values within 1.5*interquartile range (75th
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Figure 3: Standard Deviation of Abnormal Industry Returns by Attention Shift Proxy Decile Rank
The following figures are intended to illustrate the relationship between specific characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting attention shift proxy decile ranks. To this end, we compute, at each day, the
standard deviation of different types of abnormal industry returns, where industries are represented by the 49
Fama/French (1997) segments. The upper graph uses (raw) abnormal returns, the middle graph uses absolute
abnormal returns, and the lower graph uses weighted absolute abnormal returns, where industry weights are
determined by the inverse of the volatility of their shock variables over the previous year. See section 2 of
the paper for a detailed description of how abnormal returns and weights are computed. By attention shift
proxy decile ranks, the boxes illustrate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the time-series of the standard
deviation of these abnormal returns. The adjacent values in the box plot are the most extreme values within
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Figure 4: Maximum Fraction of a Single Industry Return Shock by Attention Shift Proxy Decile Rank
The following figure is intended to illustrate the relationship between specific characteristics of abnormal
industry-level returns and resulting attention shift proxy decile ranks. To this end, we first compute the
baseline attention shift proxy as outlined in section 2 of the paper. In short, the proxy is constructed as the
sum of weighted absolute abnormal industry returns, where industries are represented by the 49 Fama/French
(1997) segments. For each day, we then identify the maximum fraction a single industry return shock accounts
for. By attention shift proxy decile ranks, the boxes illustrate the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the
time-series of this maximum weight. The adjacent values in the box plot are the most extreme values within
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Table 3: Modified Attention Shift Proxies: Descriptions
This table reports descriptive statistics of the baseline and 10 modified attention shift proxies. Factor loadings with respect to the model of expected returns are estimated
from time-series regressions based on daily data over the previous year. In the value-weighted case, abnormal industry returns are weighted by the relative market
capitalization of industries. The interquartile range is computed as the 75th percentile of the cross-section of daily abnormal industry returns minus the 25th percentile.
In model 9, the time-series of the baseline distraction proxy is orthogonalized with respect to the time-series of the average idiosyncratic volatility of the constituents of
the pairs that diverge on a given day. Using the same method as in the baseline approach, attention shift proxy decile ranks are then computed from the residual. Returns
on the 100 portfolios formed on book-to-market and size as well as on the 25 portfolios formed on size and short-term reversal are taken from Kenneth French’s data
library. Mode 12 is based on rolling historical raw proxy data. Specifically, for a given day, we use the preceding 250 trading days to compute the distraction decile the
day belongs to. This implies that the beginning of the sample period is one year later (January 1963) than in the baseline case.
Proxy Label Proxy availability Computation Scheme Expected returns Market Segments
Baseline Attention Shift Proxy 1/1962-12/2008 Volatility-weighting of absolute abnormal returns OLS Market Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 1 1/1961-12/2008 Equal-weighting of absolute abnormal returns OLS Market Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 2 1/1961-12/2008 Value-weighting of absolute abnormal returns OLS Market Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 3 7/1964-12/2008 Equal-weighting of absolute abnormal returns Four-Factor Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 4 7/1964-12/2008 Value-weighting of absolute abnormal returns Four-Factor Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 5 7/1965-12/2008 Volatility-weighting of absolute abnormal returns Four-Factor Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 6 1/1961-12/2008 Interquartile range of raw abnormal returns (Q3 - Q1) OLS Market Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 7 7/1964-12/2008 Interquartile range of raw abnormal returns (Q3-Q1) Four-Factor Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 8 1/1960-12/2008 Regression approach with raw returns None 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 9 1/1964-12/2008 Baseline approach orthogonal to firm-level idiosyncratic risk OLS Market Model 49 Fama French Industries
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 10 7/1965-12/2008 Volatility-weighting of absolute abnormal returns OLS Market Model 100 book-to-market x size
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 11 7/1964-12/2008 Volatility-weighting of absolute abnormal returns OLS Market Model 25 size x short-term reversal
Alternative Attention Shift Proxy 12 1/1963-12/2008 Volatility-weighting of absolute abnormal returns (real-time availability) OLS Market Model 49 Fama French Industries
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Table 4: Transition Matrix: Baseline Attention Proxy Decile Ranks and Modified Ranks Available in Real Time (1/1963-12/2008, N=102,259)
This table shows the transition matrix for baseline attention shift proxy decile ranks and modified decile ranks, which are based on rolling historical raw proxy data.
Specifically, for a given day, we use the preceding 250 trading days to compute the distraction decile the day belongs to. This implies that the beginning of the sample
period is one year later (January 1963) than in the baseline case. Computations are based on all 102,259 sample pair trades, which are opened between January 1963 and
December 2008. This implies that attention shift proxy ranks at days where more (less) pairs diverge have a stronger (weaker) impact on the results displayed.
Modified attention shift proxy based on rolling historical data
Decile rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 64.55% 17.04% 4.82% 1.67% 0.97% 0.49% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
2 21.02% 42.55% 18.31% 8.68% 5.55% 2.36% 0.81% 0.44% 0.13% 0.00% 100.00%
3 8.32% 19.41% 36.20% 18.91% 9.46% 8.04% 3.06% 0.95% 0.42% 0.00% 100.00%
4 4.49% 8.52% 18.25% 33.55% 15.57% 11.03% 7.14% 4.14% 1.28% 0.11% 100.00%
Baseline 5 1.41% 6.03% 8.13% 17.98% 35.40% 17.63% 12.46% 7.23% 2.39% 0.35% 100.00%
6 0.20% 4.88% 5.87% 6.71% 17.58% 31.48% 17.18% 12.82% 4.99% 1.48% 100.00%
7 0.00% 1.33% 5.62% 6.60% 5.89% 16.81% 31.62% 21.47% 10.93% 2.46% 100.00%
8 0.00% 0.23% 1.92% 4.30% 5.64% 7.35% 17.31% 31.14% 24.39% 6.93% 100.00%
9 0.00% 0.00% 0.89% 1.40% 3.46% 3.52% 7.34% 16.73% 42.47% 21.69% 100.00%
10 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.49% 1.29% 2.88% 5.08% 12.99% 66.97% 100.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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C Momentum Approaches
The next page provides an overview over the fourteen long-short momentums strategies,
which are derived from previous work and relied on in this analysis in the paper. ID
is a running number to identify anomalies, Momentum Anomaly offers a corresponding
name. If not noted otherwise, all approaches are computed using a formation period
of six months, a skipped month, and a holding period of six months with overlapping
portfolios. If momentum is interacted with other firm variables, than this is done based
on an independent 5*5 sorting in each month.
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ID Anomaly Short Description Reference Papers Type of Portfolios Computation
1 Standard momentum Winners of the recent past out-
perform losers of the recent past
Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993)




Momentum is stronger in
younger firms
Zhang (2006) 5 Past Returns * 5 Age
(5,1 - 1,1)
Age is computed as the number of months since min (IPO Date from Compustat,
PERMCO appears in CRSP). The youngest firms are in quintile 1.
3 Turnover-enhanced mo-
mentum




5 Past Returns * 5
Turnover (5,5 - 1,5)
We use NASDAQ-adjusted turnover as proposed in Anderson and Dyl (2005).
4 Market-to-book ratio-
enhanced momentum
Momentum ist stronger among
firms with high market-to-book
ratios
Asness (1997), Daniel
and Titman (1999), Sagi
and Seasholes (2007)
5 Past Returns * 5
Market-to-Book (5,5 -
1,5)




Momentum is stronger among
firms with low credit rating
Avramov et al. (2007) 5 Past Returns * 5
Credit Rating (5,5 - 1,5)
We rely on the S&P domestic long term issuer credit rating, which uses 22 ratings
from AAA to D. Portfolio 1 denotes the firms with the best rating.
6 Size-enhanced Momen-
tum
Momentum is stronger among
small firms
Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993), Hong et al.
(2000), Zhang (2006)
5 Past Returns * 5 Size
(5,1 - 1,1)
Size is computed based on NYSE market capitalization quintiles (i.e. stocks from
the first NYSE deciles are not dropped though the 5$ barrier remains). Portfolio




Momentum is stronger among
firms with low residual analyst
coverage
Hong et al. (2000) 5 Past Returns * 5
Residual Analyst Cover-
age (5,1 - 1,1)
Residual analyst coverage is based on monthly cross-sectional regressions of ln
(1+number analysts, 0 if missing) on one month lagged macap + nasdaq dummy.
As in Hong et al. (2000), coverage is measured stale, i.e. in t-12. Portfolio 1 denotes
the firms with the lowest coverage.
8 Forecast dispersion-
enhanced momentum
Momentum is stronger among




5 Past Returns * 5 Ana-
lyst Forecast Dispersion
(5,5 - 1,5)
Forecast dispersion is based on the screens for residual analyst coverage. At least
two analysts need to cover the firm. Portfolio 1 denotes the firms with the lowest
forecast dispersion.
8 R2 enhanced momentum Momentum is stronger among
low firms with low R2
Hou et al. (2006) 5 Past Returns * 5
R2(5, 1− 1, 1)
R2 is determined by regressing monthly firm excess returns on a Carhart (1997)
model over the preceding 60 months. Values are then sorted in quintiles based on
NYSE stock cut-offs. Portfolio 1 denotes the firms with the lowest R2.
10 Return consistency-
enhanced momentum
Momentum is stronger for firms
with consistently positive (or




5 Past Returns condi-
tioned on winner/loser
consistency dummy=1
The winner (loser) consistency dummy takes on a value of 1 if at least 5 out of
the 6 formation period returns were positive (negative). Only these stocks are









5 Past Returns * 5
Idiosyncratic volatility
(5,5 - 1,5)
Idiosyncratic volatility is estimated as root mean squared error obtained from
time-series regressions of monthly firm returns on a Carhart (1997) model over
the months t-62 to t-2. Portfolio 1 denotes firms with low idiosyncratic volatility.
12 52 week high-enhanced
momentum
Momentum is stronger among
winners (losers) close (far away)
from the 52 week high
George and Hwang
(2004)
5 Past Returns * 5 Near-
ness to 52 week high (5,5
- 1,1)




Momentum is stronger for firms




10 Past Returns (10-1) Formation period returns are computed as the cumulative return in months t-7 to
t-1.
14 Intermediate momentum Intermediate returns (i.e. t-12 to
t-7) cause momentum




D.1 Standardized unexpected earnings and top 100 pairs
To assess whether firms identified with the pairs trading techniques used in the paper
are also fundamentally related, we start by pooling all monthly top 100 pairs from Jan-
uary 1990 on.2 We then construct standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) for each firm
during the following year. More specifically, we consider all cases in which both firms
announce same-quarter earnings within the 12 months period immediately following pairs
formation.3
We rely on Compustat Fundamental Quarterly to compute earnings per share ex-
cluding extraordinary items. Following standard practice (see e.g. Chordia and Shivaku-
mar (2006)), SUE are constructed relying on a seasonal random walk model of quarterly
earnings. Unexpected earnings are defined as the difference between the most recently
announced earnings per share and the earnings per share in the same quarter of the
previous year. Unexpected earnings are then standardized by the standard deviation of
unexpected earnings computed over the previous eight quarters. For each quarter under
consideration, we then compute SUE not only for the top 100 pairs as outlined above,
but additionally for each firm with non-missing data in the CRSP/Compustat merged
database. This allows us to take market-wide trends in earnings growth into account. As
in e.g. Hirshleifer et al. (2009), we then perform quarterly decile sorts of all stocks based
on their SUE.4 Thus, firms with the most negative (positive) earnings surprise in a given
quarter obtain a value of 1 (10). The mean value is 5.5.
We then focus our attention on the in total 44,820 observations of same quarter SUEs
for the top 100 pairs in the year following pair formation. More specifically, we are inter-
2The start date is chosen to ensure (earnings and earnings announcement) data quality and to match the start date used
in several other tests in the paper (e.g. on the role of the VIX or the media). However, our inferences remain unchanged if
we rely on earlier or later starting dates. The end year is 2009 as the last year of pairs formation is 2008.
3For instance, assume a top 100 pair whose formation period runs from January 2000 to December 2000. We then
consider all quarterly earnings announced over January 2001 to December 2001. Findings are similar if we include a lag of
one quarter between both periods.
4Findings are even slightly stronger if we rely on yearly as opposed to quarterly sorts.
22
ested whether knowing the first pair constituent’s SUE for a given quarter helps to predict
the second pair constituent’s SUE for the same quarter. A significantly positive relation
would be suggestive of a fundamental link between both firms. To answer this question,
we run a pooled tobit regression of the 44,820 SUEs of the later announcing firms on
the SUE of the corresponding earlier announcing firms. Standard errors are clustered by
quarter. The variable of interest, the marginal effect of the earlier announcing firm’s SUE,
takes on a highly significant (t-statistic: 7.06) value of 0.0606. We obtain similar coeffi-
cients in multivariate settings controlling for e.g. differences in firm market capitalization
or turnover.
Collectively, these findings suggest that the first constituent’s earnings surprise has ex-
planatory power for the second (=later announcing) constituent’s earnings surprise. Note
that this is not a simple industry effect as both firms are required to belong to different 49
Fama/French industries. Thus, this statistically highly significant and economically non-
trivial result lends support to the idea that firms of top pairs are fundamentally related
despite operating in different market segments.
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D.2 Further time-series insights into the role of limited attention
As a first test, we analyze the role of other investor distraction proxies, which are inspired
by previous work. Specifically, we construct five simple alternative dummy variables for
limited attention in the time-series.
Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Peress (2008), we employ a Friday dummy.
Following the idea developed in Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and Peress (2008), we construct
a variable based on the number of same-day events competing for investor attention. To
this end, we compute the number of pairs opening on a given day. There is considerable
variation in each year and no general time trend. The latter is not surprising, as the
number of pairs eligible for trading remains constant after the first six months of the
sample period, which we exclude. As the number of opening pairs is significantly positively
correlated (0.25) with attention shift proxy decile ranks, we rely on the orthogonalized
number of diverging pairs. Finally, we use the top and bottom quintile to identify days
with an unexpectedly large number (dummy=1) or small number (dummy=0) of newly
opening pairs.
With regard to the third and fourth proxy, we follow Hou et al. (2009) and Karlsson
et al. (2009), who provide evidence that investors tend to be less attentive during down
market periods. We create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if NBER classifies
a month as recession and zero otherwise. An alternative dummy takes the value of one if
the cumulative three year value-weighted market return is negative and zero otherwise.
Our fifth proxy is inspired by recent studies such as Da et al. (2011) or Mondria and Wu
(2012). It uses the main Google-based distraction proxy briefly described in more detail
in appendix B.1. Exploiting shocks in internet search volume between January 2004 and
December 2008, the approach aims to quantify changes in the relative demand for market-
level as opposed to firm-level information. As with the number of competing events, we
again use the top and bottom quintile to identify days with a particularly strong demand
(dummy=1) or weak demand (dummy=0) for aggregate stock market information.
We then imitate our baseline approach of section 4 in the paper by regressing pair
returns separately on each of these limited attention dummies (specification 1) as well as
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on the full set of control variables used in panel B of table 4, including the attention shift
proxy decile rank (specification 2). As we have five alternative proxies, two regression
specifications, and two return computation schemes, we run 20 regressions in total. Each
of the attention dummies is constructed in a way that a positive coefficient is expected.
The main findings are presented in panel A of table 5.
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Table 5: Further Tests (I): Investor Attention and Pairs Trading Profitability
Panel A reports the impact of alternative limited attention dummies on the profitability of pairs trading. Details about the construction of each proxy are given in
the text. Specification 1 displays findings from univariate tests. Specification 2 is multivariate (see panel b of table 4 in the paper for details). Due to the limited
number of observations, the multivariate regression with the Google-based dummy does not controls for industry groups. In all cases, standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel B shows the implied percentage increase in return difference
between enhanced high and low distraction scenarios when benchmarked against the baseline findings in table 4 of the paper. Enhanced high (low) distraction scenarios
are defined as days satisfying both distraction proxy decile rank=10 and alternative limited attention dummy=1 (distraction decile=1 + alternative dummy=0). In
panel C, we compare mean and median returns of pairs opening on the last trading day before federal holidays with mean and median returns of pairs opening on
any other day of the year. The table shows the fraction of years in which returns on pre-holiday pairs trading are higher. P-values (in parentheses) are computed from
one-sided binominal probability tests with an assumed yearly success rate of 50%. Excess probability of convergence is computed as the difference between the fraction
of converging pairs that diverged immediately before the federal holiday and the fraction of converging pairs that diverged on any other day of the year. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. In all panels, statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A: Impact of Limited Attention Proxies Inspired by Previous Work
Model specification Fridays No. pairs opening NBER recessions 3Y market return Google
Specification 1 0.0002 0.0033*** 0.0090*** 0.0055*** 0.0117*
(no further controls) (0.21) (3.18) (8.99) (5.51) (1.72)
Specification 2 0.0007 0.0008 0.0041** 0.0003 0.0234*
(full set of controls) (0.28) (0.71) (2.31) (0.25) (1.81)
Panel B: Implied Percentage Increase in the Return Difference between High Distraction and Low Distraction Scenarios
Model specification Fridays No. pairs opening NBER recessions 3Y market return Google
Specification 1 (no further controls) 10.30% 1.34% 99.35% 71.98% 23.30%
Specification 2 (full set of controls) 42.70% 2.60% 40.86% 41.65% 18.98%
Panel C: Relative Success of Pre-Holiday Pairs Trading
Pairs Trading Returns New Year’s Day Washington’s Birthday Memorial Day
Mean 72%*** 61%* 47%
Median 70%*** 46% 45%
Excess probability of convergence 15.77%*** -0.48% 3.87%
(baseline: 36.15%-36.3%) (3.67) (-0.14) (0.94)
Pairs Trading Returns Independence Day Labor Day Thanksgiving Christmas Day
Mean 51% 60% 61%* 70%***
Median 53% 60% 55% 63.%*
Excess probability of convergence 5.61% 3.87% 0.42% 7.39%*
(baseline: 36.15%-36.3%) (1.35) (1.14) (0.10) (1.68)
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As predicted, the coefficient is positive in all 20 cases although some proxies lack
significance, in particular if one controls for calendar, industry, market, firm, and pair
characteristics. The persistently positive sign is broadly consistent with the idea of limited
attention affecting the relative efficiency of linked assets.
Given these insights, we explore whether the sensitivity of pairs trading returns to at-
tention shift proxy decile ranks becomes even higher when considering the proxy’s possible
interaction with the attention proxies inspired by previous work.
Specifically, consider the following two extreme scenarios. The first sample consists of all
days with attention shift proxy decile rank 10 for which, at the same time, the alternative
distraction proxy also identifies a distracting situation (e.g. a Friday or a down market
period). In these cases, attention constraints should become particularly binding. The
second sample consists of all days with attention shift decile rank 1 for which, at the
same time, the alternative distraction proxy also identifies a situation in which attention
constraints should be less binding. We expect the difference in returns of pairs opening in
one of these two extreme situations to be larger than the return difference between decile
10 and decile 1 in our baseline scenario (see table 4 in the paper).
We regress one-month pairs returns on the attention shift proxy decile rank, on the
alternative limited attention dummy variable, and the interaction effect (as well as on a
large set of control variables). Again, we have 20 regressions in total. Panel C of table 5
shows the implied percentage change in return difference between high and low distrac-
tion scenarios, as outlined above, when benchmarked against our baseline findings. As
hypothesized, return difference increase in each case.
Next, we study whether pairs trading is particularly profitable immediately before
those seven federal holidays for which the NYSE has been closed over the whole sample
period. This line of reasoning is backed up by work on holiday effects (e.g. Frieder and
Subrahmanyam (2004), Hong and Yu (2009)) and the distracting nature of even “ordinary
Fridays” (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)). One might be concerned about liquidity-related
market frictions on these days. Indeed, market turnover is on average about 10% to 20%
lower. However, this does not translate into lower turnover for those stocks which are
constituents of pairs diverging on these days. In fact, turnover for these firms is even
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slightly higher than in some pre-event period. Also bid-ask spreads are hardly affected. A
plausible explanation for this finding is that these firms are likely to be affected by news,
which stipulates trading activity even in a low market turnover environment.
We compare returns on pairs that diverge on the last trading day before the holiday
with returns on pairs that open on any other day. Specifically, for each year and each
holiday separately, we determine whether the mean (median) pre-holiday pairs trading
return is larger or smaller than the return over the rest of the year. Panel D of table
5 shows the fraction of years in which pre-holiday pairs trading is more profitable. The
fraction is larger than 50% in 11 out of 14 cases, and often also statistically significant.
Before Christmas and New Year’s Day, pairs trading seems particularly successful. For
instance, in about 70% of all sample years, mean and median returns from pairs opening
on the last trading day of the year are higher than corresponding returns over the rest
of the year. This is substantially driven by a considerably higher than usual fraction of
converging pairs. While on average less than 37% of pairs converge within a month, more
than 50% do if they diverge immediately before New Year’s Day.
D.3 Investor attention shifts, time-varying arbitrage risk, and pairs trading
profitability
To study the possible interaction between limits to arbitrage, our measure of investor
attention shifts, and the event-time profitability of pairs trading, we start by constructing
a set of arbitrage risk proxies derived from the literature. More specifically, we consider
the following six time-series measures:
1. The VIX, i.e. the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index. The
VIX is based on the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options. It is thus a measure of
expected stock market volatility.
2. The TED spread, i.e. the difference between the 3-months LIBOR Eurodollar rate
and the 3-months T-Bill rate. The TED spread is a risk-related spread, as short-term US
government debt is considered virtually riskless, whereas the LIBOR additionally reflects
(perceived) credit risk in interbank loans.
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3. An additional credit spread, defined as the difference between Moody’s BAA corpo-
rate bond and Moody’s AAA corporate bond rates
4. The term spread, i.e. the difference between 10 year Treasury bond yield and 3
months T-bills yield.
5. The LIBOR, i.e. the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR).
6. A measure building on the abnormal stock returns of the nine institutions studied
in Ang et al. (2011): Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP
Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. Ang et al. (2011) argue
that, at least over their sample period from 2004 to 2009, these firms might be considered
representative of the broker/dealer and investment banking activity. Ang et al. (2011) for
instance show that the average cost of protection from a default of these institutions rises
in times of high arbitrage risk as proxied by the VIX. We construct daily abnormal returns
for each of the aforementioned banks defined as the absolute difference between the actual
stock return and its expected return as implied by an OLS market model. Parameter
estimates are obtained from rolling time-series regressions based on daily return data
over the previous year. We then value-weight these abnormal returns to create an index
of abnormal daily returns for investment banks. One might argue that large unexpected
arbitrage risks might reflect themselves in negative abnormal returns for these institutions,
which are likely to be engaged in arbitrage activities.5
Databases used for the construction of the six arbitrage proxies are Thomson Reuters
Datastream, Bloomberg, CRSP, and the Federal Reserve Board H15 release. On a daily
basis, the proxies become available between January 1982 and January 1990 and then,
in each case, run until the end of our sample period in December 2008. The tables on
the following slides show the sample period for each specification. We both consider the
raw values of arbitrage proxies as well as their yearly decile ranks, computed as for the
attention shift proxy. In total, this leaves twelve measures of limits to arbitrage.
5Note that one also could come up with an alternative hypothesis: If these institutions run trading strategies which
tend to work better in times of high investor distraction, and if these times are not characterized by increased arbitrage
risk, then the abnormal stock return for these institutions might actually be positive. See for instance Menzly and Ozbas
(2010) for evidence on arbitrageurs engaging in trading strategies that profit from the cross-predictability effect in stock
prices induced by slow information diffusion. If anything, our findings reported in the following tables support this second
hypothesis, rendering explanations based on increased arbitrage risks unlikely.
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The analysis then proceeds in four steps, whose main findings are displayed in the
following four tables. First, we test the impact of time-varying arbitrage risk on pairs
trading profitability by running twelve univariate regressions.
Second, we document Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between attention
shift proxy decile ranks and the rank order of the twelve arbitrage proxies.
Third, we run multivariate regressions as in panel B of table 4 of the paper. More
specifically, we run pooled multivariate regressions of the one-month return on zero-cost
US stock-pairs on the high/low distraction dummy, the full set of controls, and, addition-
ally, on arbitrage risk proxies. We start by considering only one arbitrage proxy in each
of the twelve regressions we run. This is motivated by the partly high correlation between
these proxies. It moreover helps to distinguish which arbitrage risks really matter for the
case of pairs trading.
Finally, in a forth step, we again run multivariate regressions, but now consider more
than one arbitrage proxy in each regression. More specifically, we run ten regressions with
different sets of those arbitrage proxies which have been turned out to be most relevant
in the tests in step 3.
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Table 6: The Impact of Time-Varying Arbitrage Risk on Pairs Trading Profitability: Univariate Regressions
This table displays findings from pooled regressions of the one-month return on zero-cost US stock pairs on proxies deemed to measure time-varying arbitrage risk. With
regard to these proxies, we either use its raw value or its decile ranks, computed separately for each year. Pairs trading returns are computed under the conservative “one
day waiting” return scheme. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample start (End: 12/2008) 1/1990 1/1990 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1982 1/1982 1/1982 1/1982
Observations 39,666 39,666 48,481 48,481 48,481 48,481 48,481 48,481 57,484 57,484 57,484 57,484
Adjusted R2 0.12% 0.15% 0.08% 0.14% 0.18% 0.08% 0.01% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00%
VIX (Raw Value) 0.028***
(3.54)
VIX (Yearly Decile Ranks) 0.094***
(5.22)
TED Spread (Raw Values) 0.516***
(7.11)
TED Spread (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.071***
(4.33)
Moody’s BAA-AAA (Raw Values) 0.83***
(4.83)
Moody’s BAA-AAA (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.071***
(4.30)
LIBOR 3M (Raw Values) 0.037*
(1.69)
LIBOR 3M (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.007
(0.42)
Term Spread (Raw Values) 0.207***
(5.45)
Term Spread (Yearly Decile Ranks ) -0.002
(-0.13)
IB Abnormal Return (Raw Values) 0.148
(0.34)
IB Abnormal Return (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.0142
(0.89)
Controls for calendar and industry effects no no no no no no no no no no no no
Controls for market-level conditions no no no no no no no no no no no no
Controls for pair characteristics no no no no no no no no no no no no
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Table 7: Pair-wise correlations of proxies for arbitrage risk and distraction decile ranks
Panel A: Pairwise correlations (raw values of arbitrage proxies)
Distraction Deciles VIX TED Spread Moody’s BAA-AAA LIBOR 3M Term Spread IB Abnormal Return
Distraction Deciles Start 1.00
VIX 1/1990 0.23 1.00
TED Spread 1/1986 0.12 0.54 1.00
Moody’s BAA-AAA 1/1986 0.08 0.62 0.50 1.00
LIBOR 3M 1/1986 -0.01 -0.05 0.40 -0.09 1.00
Term Spread 1/1982 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.24 -0.56 1.00
IB Abnormal Return 1/1982 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00
Panel B: Pairwise correlations (yearly decile ranks of arbitrage proxies)
Distraction Deciles VIX TED Spread Moody’s BAA-AAA LIBOR 3M Term Spread IB Abnormal Return
Distraction Deciles Start 1.00
VIX 1/1990 0.31 1.00
TED Spread 1/1986 0.12 0.14 1.00
Moody’s BAA-AAA 1/1986 0.15 0.21 0.07 1.00
LIBOR 3M 1/1986 -0.05 -0.04 0.33 -0.13 1.00
Term Spread 1/1982 0.02 0.01 0.15 -0.05 -0.15 1.00
IB Abnormal Return 1/1982 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 1.00
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Table 8: The Impact of Time-Varying Arbitrage Risk and Investor Attention Shifts on Pairs Trading Profitability: Multivariate Regressions (1)
This table displays findings from pooled multi-variate regressions of the one-month return on zero-cost US stock pairs on the high/low distraction dummy, a set of controls
as well as on proxies deemed to measure time-varying arbitrage risk. With regard to these arbitrage proxies, we either use its raw value or its decile ranks, computed
separately for each year. All calendar-, industry-, market-, and pair-level control variables from panel B of table 4 in the paper are also included. Pairs trading returns
are computed under the conservative “one day waiting” return scheme. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample start (End: 12/2008) 1/1990 1/1990 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1986 1/1982 1/1982 1/1982 1/1982
Observations 8,372 8,372 10,422 10,422 10,422 10,422 10,422 10,422 12,434 57,484 8,372 8,372
Adjusted R2 7.07% 7.06% 7.76% 7.66% 7.60% 7.60% 7.60% 7.60% 7.22% 7.22% 7.26% 7.26%
High/Low Distraction Dummy 0.783*** 0.702*** 0.741*** 0.750*** 0.714*** 0.736*** 0.736*** 0.647*** 0.666*** 0.676*** 0.612*** 0.612***
(3.02) (2.71) (3.14) (2.98) (3.17) (2.96) (3.05) (3.07) (3.02) (3.11) (2.83) (2.77)
VIX (Raw Value) 0.038
(1.22)
VIX (Yearly Decile Ranks) 0.050
(1.09)
TED Spread (Raw Values) 1.08***
(2.96)
TED Spread (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.077**
(2.12)
Moody’s BAA-AAA (Raw Values) 0.323
(0.54)
Moody’s BAA-AAA (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.033
(0.92)
LIBOR 3M (Raw Values) -0.118
(-0.68)
LIBOR 3M (Yearly Decile Ranks ) -0.03
(-0.89)
Term Spread (Raw Values) 0.318*
(1.93)
Term Spread (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.06*
(1.91)
IB Abnormal Return (Raw Values) 12.36**
(2.29)
IB Abnormal Return (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.078**
(2.52)
Controls for calendar and industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for market-level conditions yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for pair characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Table 9: The Impact of Time-Varying Arbitrage Risk and Investor Attention Shifts on Pairs Trading Profitability: Multivariate Regressions (2)
This table displays findings from pooled multi-variate regressions of the one-month return on zero-cost US stock pairs on the high/low distraction dummy, a set of controls
as well as on proxies deemed to measure time-varying arbitrage risk. With regard to these arbitrage proxies, we either use its raw value or its decile ranks, computed
separately for each year. All calendar-, industry-, market-, and pair-level control variables from panel B in table 4 in the paper are also included. Pairs trading returns
are computed under the conservative “one day waiting” return scheme. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sample start (End: 12/2008) 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990 1/1990
Observations 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372 8,372
Adjusted R2 7.06% 7.21% 7.09% 7.16% 7.16% 7.30% 7.20% 7.24% 7.19% 7.28% 7.23%
High/Low Distraction Dummy 0.803*** 0.801*** 0.675** 0.897*** 0.847*** 0.800*** 0.672** 0.803*** 0.686** 0.787*** 0.631**
(2.90) (3.12) (2.59) (3.55) (3.33) (3.11) (2.47) (3.13) (2.54) (3.02) (2.38)
VIX (Raw Value) 0.026 0.035 0.035 0.011
(0.81) (1.10) (1.08) (0.33)
VIX (Yearly Decile Ranks) 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.037
(0.96) (0.87) (0.88) (0.80)
TED Spread (Raw Values) 1.082** 0.850** 0.850** 1.49**
(2.43) (2.06) (2.02) (2.40)
TED Spread (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.069* 0.066 0.063 0.088**
(1.67) (1.59) (1.49) (2.01)
Moody’s BAA-AAA (Raw Values) 0.706
(0.95)
Moody’s BAA-AAA (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.010
(0.28)
LIBOR 3M (Raw Values) -0.520
(-1.61)
LIBOR 3M (Yearly Decile Ranks ) -0.068*
(-1.85)
Term Spread (Raw Values) 0.232 0.001 -0.416
(0.96) (0.01) (-1.29)
Term Spread (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.033 0.027 0.010
(0.87) (0.71) (0.25)
IB Abnormal Return (Raw Values) 15.10** 13.30** 13.30** 13.52**
(2.38) (2.13) (2.13) (2.21)
IB Abnormal Return (Yearly Decile Ranks ) 0.088** 0.087** 0.086** 0.089**
(2.41) (2.35) (2.34) (2.43)
Controls for calendar and industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for market-level conditions yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls for pair characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution Function of Pairs Trading Profits by Attention Shift Deciles
This figure shows the empirical cumulative distribution function of event-time one-month returns on zero-cost
portfolios of US stock pairs sorted by attention shift proxy decile ranks as observed on the day of divergence.
Breakpoints for the deciles are determined separately for each year. We only consider low distraction days
(=decile 1) and high distraction days (=decile 10). In Panel A (B), trading positions in each pair are initiated
on the day of divergence (on the day following the convergence) and liquidated on the day of convergence (on
the day following the convergence). For better readability, extreme returns (larger than 20% or smaller than
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Figure 6: Pairs Trading Returns and Modified Attention Shift Proxies
This figure shows average one month event-time returns on US long-short stock pairs sorted by the decile
ranks of the baseline attention shift proxy (model 1) and in total twelve modified attention shift proxies.
Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix give more details about the specific modifications. Table 12 in the appendix
also provides a statistical analysis of return differences between decile 1 and decile 10.
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Table 10: Distribution of One-month Pairs Trading Abnormal Returns by Distraction Deciles
This table reports distribution details of event-time one-month returns on zero-cost portfolios of US stock pairs sorted by distraction proxy decile ranks as observed on
the day of divergence. Breakpoints for the deciles are determined separately for each year. Calculations are based on daily data from January 1962 to December 2008. In
Panel A (B), trading positions in each pair are initiated on the day of divergence (on the day following the convergence) and liquidated on the day of convergence (on the
day following the convergence).
Distraction Decile All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: One Day Waiting, Full Sample Period (1962-2008)
N 103,386 8,187 8,679 9,146 9,398 10,048 10,079 10,595 11,019 12,224 14,011
mean 0.97% 0.53% 0.86% 0.77% 0.87% 0.95% 0.94% 1.02% 1.10% 1.09% 1.30%
sd 6.57% 6.20% 6.30% 6.53% 6.32% 6.58% 6.56% 6.54% 6.52% 6.73% 7.05%
p1 -17.83% -17.23% -17.08% -18.08% -17.37% -17.04% -18.70% -17.72% -17.73% -18.06% -18.59%
p10 -7.04% -7.16% -6.60% -7.02% -6.95% -7.02% -6.95% -6.98% -6.94% -7.28% -7.28%
p25 -2.73% -3.16% -2.73% -2.77% -2.70% -2.76% -2.61% -2.70% -2.58% -2.68% -2.64%
p50 1.59% 1.24% 1.41% 1.36% 1.52% 1.57% 1.49% 1.62% 1.71% 1.72% 2.01%
p75 5.23% 4.80% 4.97% 5.05% 5.02% 5.17% 5.24% 5.27% 5.33% 5.47% 5.71%
p90 8.21% 7.49% 7.79% 7.85% 7.90% .0809082 8.16% 8.28% 8.31% 8.54% 9.00%
p99 15.19% 13.49% 14.62% 14.41% 13.81% 15.04% 15.25% 15.46% 14.92% 16.07% 16.77%
Panel B: No Waiting, Full Sample Period (1962-2008)
N 104,125 8,222 8,738 9,179 9,436 10,094 10,122 10,657 11,146 12,332 14,199
mean 1.38% 0.89% 1.20% 1.08% 1.23% 1.31% 1.35% 1.33% 1.53% 1.56% 1.90%
sd 6.77% 6.40% 6.41% 6.70% 6.57% 6.75% 6.71% 6.76% 6.69% 6.95% 7.30%
p1 -18.55% -17.21% -17.65% -18.74% -18.33% -17.98% -19.22% -19.17% -17.93% -18.61% -19.29%
p10 -7.11% -7.20% -6.65% -7.13% -7.06% -7.05% -7.00% -7.10% -7.13% -7.31% -7.36%
p25 -2.62% -3.03% -2.58% -2.74% -2.61% -2.63% -2.44% -2.75% -2.49% -2.63% -2.45%
p50 2.14% 1.48% 1.80% 1.68% 1.96% 2.03% 2.09% 2.16% 2.35% 2.54% 2.94%
p75 6.33% 5.90% 5.96% 6.03% 6.11% 6.27% 6.29% 6.33% 6.45% 6.62% 6.95%
p90 8.47% 7.79% 7.99% 8.04% 8.18% 8.33% 8.32% 8.45% 8.57% 8.82% 9.54%
p99 13.80% 12.12% 12.40% 13.12% 12.83% 13.12% 12.99% 13.50% 13.63% 14.30% 15.85%
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Table 11: Performance Ratios (Monthly) of Pairs Trading by Distraction Deciles
This table reports performance ratios of event-time one-month returns on zero-cost (long-short) portfolios of US stock pairs sorted by distraction proxy decile ranks
as observed on the day of divergence. Breakpoints for the deciles are determined separately for each year. Calculations are based on daily data from January 1962 to
December 2008. In Panel A (B), trading positions in each pair are initiated on the day of divergence (on the day following the convergence) and offset on the day of
convergence (on the day following the convergence). The Sharpe Ratio is computed as the average return of a trade divided by the average standard deviation. The
Rachev Ratio refers to the expected tail return divided by the expected tail loss. We compute it as the average return above the median return divided by the (absolute
value of the) Conditional VaR at the 95% level. The Rachev Ratio is thus highest for strategies that best manage to simultaneously deliver high returns and provide
insurance for high losses.The Sortino Ratio is computed as the average return divided by its downsize volatility.
Distraction Decile All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: One Day Waiting, Full Sample Period (1962-2008)
N 103,386 8,187 8,679 9,146 9,398 10,048 10,079 10,595 11,019 12,224 14,011
Sharpe Ratio 0.148 0.086 0.136 0.118 0.138 0.144 0.144 0.156 0.168 0.162 0.185
Rachev Ratio 0.390 0.366 0.386 0.366 0.383 0.387 0.376 0.398 0.405 0.400 0.413
Sortino Ratio 0.266 0.187 0.239 0.202 0.243 0.248 0.253 0.262 0.305 0.301 0.343
Panel B: No Waiting, Full Sample Period (1962-2008)
N 104,125 8,222 8,738 9,179 9,436 10,094 10,122 10,657 11,146 12,332 14,199
Sharpe Ratio 0.204 0.139 0.187 0.162 0.187 0.194 0.201 0.197 0.228 0.224 0.261
Rachev Ratio 0.426 0.400 0.414 0.394 0.412 0.420 0.404 0.422 0.448 0.441 0.465
Sortino Ratio 0.195 0.117 0.178 0.147 0.182 0.187 0.186 0.211 0.224 0.218 0.244
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Table 12: Modified Attention Shift Proxies: One-month Pairs Trading Returns by Distraction Deciles
This table reports one-month event-time returns on zero-cost portfolios of stock pairs sorted by attention shift proxy deciles as observed on the day of the divergence.
Breakpoints for the attention shifts deciles of each proxy are determined separately for each year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
clustered by day of pair divergence. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Attention Distraction Proxy No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Distraction Decile 1 0.0056*** 0.0055*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0067*** 0.0062*** 0.0056*** 0.0079*** 0.0081*** 0.0069*** 0.0061*** 0.0066***
(0.00100) (0.000967) (0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00104) (0.00101) (0.000979) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.000970) (0.000929) (0.000916)
Distraction Decile 10 0.0133*** 0.0119*** 0.0132*** 0.0119*** 0.0135*** 0.0127*** 0.0141*** 0.0120*** 0.0128*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0121***
(0.000981) (0.000990) (0.00101) (0.000997) (0.00102) (0.000997) (0.00104) (0.000938) (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00105) (0.000935)
Difference (10-1) 0.0077*** 0.0064*** 0.0067*** 0.0053*** 0.0068*** 0.0065*** 0.0085*** 0.0041*** 0.0047*** 0.0066*** 0.00742*** 0.00552***
(0.00140) (0.00138) (0.00145) (0.00144) (0.00146) (0.00142) (0.00143) (0.00142) (0.00147) (0.00141) (0.00140) (0.00131)
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Table 13: High and low distraction pairs conditioned on the level of return differential on the day of divergence
To demonstrate that the level of the return differential on the day of divergence as well as the number of opening pairs do not drive our findings, we perform conditional
sorts. We first focus on the subsample of pairs that diverge on a high or low distraction day. The first row (“Baseline”) of the following table shows the results. High
distraction pairs outperform low distraction pairs by 77 basis points per month. However, there are 14,011 pair trades on high distraction days, while there are only 8,187
trades on low distraction days. In addition, the return difference on the day of divergence is 3.59% on high distraction days and only 2.38% on low distraction days. Thus,
it could be the case that our findings were primarily driven by these factors instead of by the attention shift proxy. We therefore restrict our focus to the subsample of
high or low distraction pairs which at the same time exhibit a return differential at the day of divergence of less than a given threshold. We start with a cut-off of 5% and
then step-wise impose stricter screens until we arrive at a threshold of 1%. As the table shows, this has three consequences: First, the number of opening pairs on high
and low distraction days becomes very similar. Under the 1% and 2% constraints, even more pairs open on low than on high distraction days. Second, also the return
differential attributable to the day of divergence becomes similar. Under the 1% constraint, the difference is 0.00%. Thus, these two aspects can hardly drive potential
differences in pairs trading profitability during high and low distraction days in this setting. It is worth noting that most other firm and pair characteristics are very
similar across attention shift decile ranks, as table 3 in the paper verifies. Third, however, the impact of the attention shift proxy remains very stable, significant, and
economically large under each constraint. Thus, holding the number of opening pairs as well as the return differential constant, the attention shift proxy matters to about
the same extent as in the baseline analysis. It is worth noting that similar insights are obtained from multivariate regressions (table 4 of the paper), in which we include
the return difference on the day of divergence as a control variable. Coefficients are shown on the following page.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
N N Return diff (divergence) Return diff (divergence) (3)-(4) Pairs Trading Return Pairs Trading Return (6)-(5)
High distraction Low distraction High distraction Low distraction High distraction Low distraction
Baseline 14,011 8,187 3.59% 2.38% 1.21% 1.30% 0.53% 0.77%***
max. 5% return differential 11,227 7,619 2.50% 1.99% 0.51% 1.20% 0.55% 0.65%***
max. 3% return differential 7,403 6,222 1.79% 1.58% 0.20% 1.14% 0.50% 0.64%***
max. 2% return differential 4,217 4,273 1.26% 1.18% 0.07% 1.18% 0.45% 0.73%***
max 1% return differential 1,275 1,537 0.65% 0.65% 0.00% 1.14% 0.27% 0.87%***
40
Table 14: Multivariate Analysis: Attention Shifts and Returns on Pairs Trading
This table displays coefficients obtained from model specifications 3 and 6 of panel B, table 4 in the paper.
These coefficients are estimated from pooled multivariate regressions of the one-month return on zero-cost
US stock pairs (in %) on the attention shift proxy as well as on a number of control variables. The attention
shift proxy is quantified by means of the Attention shift deciles (left-hand side, model 3 in table 4) or a
High/Low Distraction Dummy (right-hand side, model 6 in table 4), which is zero for low distraction days
(decile 1) and one for high distraction days (decile 10). Displayed are coefficients for all pair characteristics
computed as outlined in table 3 and 4 of the paper (average firm market capitalization decile rank, ln (average
pre-event turnover), ln (average pre-event Amihud illiquidity ratio), average idiosyncratic risk, bid/ask spread
as in Corwin and Schultz (2012), S&P membership dummy, within-pair differences in these variables, return
difference attributable to the day of divergence, ln (average turnover on day of divergence) and ln (difference in
turnover on day of divergence)). Displayed are also coefficients obtained for controls of market-level conditions
on the day of divergence (market return, squared market return, market turnover, 10 day rolling volatility,
factors for daily return premia on size, value, momentum and short-term reversal, average bid/ask spread. ).
Included in the regression (but not shown) are moreover controls for calendar and industry effects (indicator
variables for year, month, day of week, and pair industry group combinations). Statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. T-statistics (in parentheses) are adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered by day of pair divergence.
Model specification Model (3), panel B, table 4 in the paper Model (6), panel B, table 4 in the paper
Sample period 1/1962-12/2008 1/1962-12/2008
Observations 103,386 22,198
R2 3.75% 9.04%
Attention shift deciles 0.039*** (3.33)
High/low distraction dummy 0.501*** (3.03)
Pair-level variables
Difference in NYSE/AMEX macap decile 0.011 (0.34) 0.039 (0.62)
Difference in (pre-event) Amihud illiquidity ratio 0.012 (0.44) -0.085 (-1.38)
Difference in (pre-event) daily turnover -0.087*** (-3.90) -0.143*** (-2.95)
Difference in (pre-event) idiosyncratic risk 0.186 (1.14) 0.326 (1.03)
Difference in turnover on day of divergence -0.034 (-1.35) 0.012 (0.23)
Difference in bid/ask spread on day of divergence 0.056* (1.88) 0.104 (1.44)
Difference in S&P membership -0.020 (-0.37) -0.166 (-1.38)
Average NYSE/AMEX macap decile 0.073 (1.11) 0.106 (0.76)
Average (pre-event) Amihud illiquidity ratio 0.209* (1.68) 0.250 (0.94)
Average (pre-event) daily turnover 0.076 (0.70) 0.596** (2.53)
Average (pre-event) idiosyncratic risk 0.757*** (4.11) 1.065*** (2.85)
Average turnover on day of divergence -0.014 (-.20) -0.135 (-1.04)
Average bid/ask spread on day of divergence -0.067** (-2.14) -0.115 (-1.50)
Average S&P membership 0.140 (1.32) 0.179 (0.77)
Return difference at day of divergence -0.038 (-0.02) 1.909 (0.46)
Market-level variables at day of divergence
Average bid-ask spread 0.731*** (3.25) 0.611** (2.28)
Rolling 10 day volatility 0.158 (1.56) 0.078 (0.49)
Squared market return -0.002 (-0.61) 0.007 (1.64)
Market turnover 1.14** (2.32) 0.540 (0.69)
Market premium over risk-free rate -0.025 (-0.25) 0.052 (0.86)
Small firm factor (SMB) -0.089* (-1.70) -0.238** (-2.57)
Value firm factor (HML) -0.046 (-0.54) 0.108 (0.89)
Momentum factor (UMD) -0.002 (-0.03) -0.026 (-0.28)
Short-term reversal factor -0.061 (-1.15) -0.085 (-1.12)
Controls industry effects yes yes
Controls calendar effects yes yes
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Pairs Trading Samples in International Stock Markets
In panel A, Total market capitalization refers to the value reported by Thomson Financial Datastream for the total domestic market capitalization at the year-end 2002,
which roughly marks the middle of the sample period for most countries . In panel B, Number of industries states how many of the 10 Global Industry Classification
Standard (GICS) industry sectors are represented in the pairs trading sample. Maximum industry weight denotes the largest fraction of sample firms belonging to a
specific industry group. Industry concentration is computed as the sum of squared industry weights. In panel C, values are computed analogously for within-pair industry
group combinations.
Japan UK France Germany Switzerland Italy Netherlands Hongkong
Panel A: Overall Market Characteristics
Sample period 1/1995-12/2009 1/1995-12/2009 1/1996-12/2009 1/1996-12/2009 6/1997-12/2009 6/1995-12/2009 1/1995-12/2009 1/1995-12/2009
Total market cap. (in billion USD) 2100.19 1819.29 877.87 651.57 540.76 448.22 429.80 417.61
Number of sample firms 4,873 4,867 1,424 1,302 387 500 354 521
Number of firm days (in million) 12.00 6.35 2.11 2.54 0.32 0.47 0.68 0.87
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Number of industries 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10
Max. industry weight Fraction 26.50% 20.88% 25.88% 21.29% 30.13% 31.65% 26.99% 38.11%
Industry Industrials Cons. Discretionary Financials Industrials Financials Financials Financials Financials
Industry concentration 16.16% 14.81% 16.46% 21.29% 18.07% 18.79% 17.46% 22.16%
Panel C: Pair Characteristics
Total no. of pairs traded 36,992 27,185 25,833 26,006 16,841 25,596 21,320 20,894
Average turnover Mean 0.16% 0.44% 0.21% 0.35% 0.43% 0.41% 0.50% 0.56%
at day of divergence Median 0.09% 0.28% 0.12% 0.20% 0.25% 0.26% 0.28% 0.29%
Cumul. return difference Mean 6.53% 8.17% 9.86% 11.70% 12.41% 10.90% 11.13% 16.50%
upon divergence Median 5.99% 7.37% 9.45% 11.20% 11.47% 9.96% 10.69% 14.96%
Return difference Mean 3.70% 3.21% 4.07% 4.73% 4.24% 4.30% 4.18% 5.91%
at day of divergence Median 2.88% 2.40% 3.30% 3.69% 3.00% 3.34% 3.07% 4.46%
No. industry group comb. 41 45 44 42 42 44 36 45
Max. industry group weight Fraction 11.55% 13.98% 13.39% 12.40% 14.96% 21.29% 19.20% 24.82%
Industries Industrials Cons. Discretionary Industrials and Industrials Health Care Con. Discretionary Industrials Industrials
and Financials and Financials and Financials Cons. Discretionary and Financials and Financials and Financials and Financials
Industry group concentration 6.61% 6.00% 6.71% 6.29% 8.31% 9.26% 7.83% 13.05%
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